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ABSTRACT 
 
Corporate Governance, Competition, the New International 
Financial Architecture and Large Corporations in 
 Emerging Markets. 
 
Ajit Singh
1
, Alaka Singh
2
 and Bruce Weisse
3
. 
 
 
This paper examines from the developing countries perspective important analytical 
and policy issues arising from: a) the current international discussions about corporate 
governance in relation to the New International Financial Architecture; b) changes in 
the international competitive environment being caused by the enormous international 
merger movement in advanced countries.  
 
The background to a) above is the emergence of corporate governance as a key issue 
in the current G7 proposals for the New International Financial Architecture. The G7 
emphasis on corporate governance can be traced back to the thesis that the ‘deeper’ 
reasons for the Asian crisis lay in the microeconomic behaviour of corporations and 
businesses in the affected countries. The failings of the corporate governance 
mechanisms and distortions in the competitive process have received special scrutiny 
in such analyses. 
 
With respect to b) above, the context is that the largest corporations in advanced 
countries are currently in the process of potentially cartelising the world market place 
through a spate of cross-border mergers and take-overs.  This huge merger movement 
raises serious policy concerns for developing countries. 
 
The paper's main conclusions are:  
 
1. The thesis that the deeper causes of the Asian crisis were the flawed systems of 
corporate governance and a poor competitive environment in the affected 
countries is not supported by evidence. 
 
2. The Anglo-Saxon model of widely held corporations with dispersed share 
ownership is by far the exception in developing countries and in much of 
continental Europe. Empirical evidence suggests that emerging markets, as well as 
European countries such as Italy, Sweden or Germany have successful records of 
fast long-term growth with different governance systems, indeed superior to those 
of Anglo-Saxon countries.  
 
3. Empirical evidence does not support the view that the Asian crisis 1997 to 1999 
was caused by crony capitalism. 
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4. Corporate financing patterns in emerging markets in the 1990s were broadly 
similar to those observed in the 1980s. Unlike their counterparts in advanced 
countries, large developing countries firms continued to rely overwhelmingly on 
external sources to finance their growth of total assets. 
 
5. The analysis of this paper does not support the claim that developing country 
conglomerates are inefficient, financially precarious and necessarily create moral 
hazard. It also indicates that contrary to widely held beliefs, product market 
competition in emerging countries is no less intense than in advanced economies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key words: Corporate governance, competition, emerging markets. 
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 “The proper governance of companies will become as crucial to the world economy 
as the proper governing of countries.” James Wolfensohn, President World Bank 
 
I.  Introduction 
Since the dramatic events of the Asian financial crisis, followed by the financial crises 
in Russia and Brazil and the associated difficulties with the highly leveraged U.S. 
hedge fund Long Term Capital Management (LTCM), there has been widespread 
concern in the G-7 industrial countries with the stability of the international financial 
system.  In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, many initiatives were launched to 
reform the system and establish, in former U.S. Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin’s 
phrase, a “New International Financial Architecture”.  However, with the abatement 
of the crisis, any interest in the serious reform of the international financial system if 
it ever existed appears to have evaporated.  Nevertheless, with the ostensible objective 
of preventing future crises, G-7 countries are continuing to press for reforms in 
developing countries with respect to their financial and economic systems.  The 
central G-7 argument is that the proposed reforms in developing countries are 
essential to make the global markets function properly.  The implicit suggestion is that 
the financial crises were not the outcome of market failures but rather the failure of 
developing country governments and institutions which did not provide accurate and 
adequate information to markets, and imposed other distortions on it.  This thesis is 
not accepted by many economists, but nonetheless, such reforms were pressed on the 
crisis-affected Asian countries as part of IMF conditionality and are now being 
advocated for other developing countries.  Whether or not the G-7 analysis is correct, 
given the distribution of political and economic power in world affairs, developing 
countries would be well advised to acquire a full understanding of the nature of the 
reforms being proposed and their implications for long-term economic development.  
 
This paper concentrates on two of the proposed subjects of reform.  First, the question 
of corporate governance – how large enterprises are governed and operated in 
developing countries.  Secondly, it is concerned with closely connected questions of 
domestic and international competition policies in an environment of liberalisation 
and globalisation.  This paper will set out the main proposals which are being 
discussed in these areas and critically examine their implications specifically for long-
term economic development.  Developing countries are not generally exercised by 
these two issues in the way advanced countries are.  A large number of them do not 
have competition policies at all.  Similarly, corporate governance has not been on the 
top of the development agenda for most developing countries.  The main purpose of 
this paper is to provide developing countries with an appreciation of the issues 
involved in the proposed reforms, so that they can make informed judgements about 
the desirability of their implementation, and, if necessary, formulate counterproposals. 
 
This paper is organised as follows.  Section II provides the essential background to the 
G-7 proposals on corporate governance which have their origins in the perceived 
structural weaknesses of the Asian economies on the eve of the crisis.  This section 
also sets out the main proposals which are currently the subject of attention.  Section 
 7 
III provides information on the systems of corporate governance which prevail in 
developing countries and how they differ from those in advanced economies.  Section 
IV considers the role of large corporations in emerging markets and specifically how 
they are financed, a question which is closely related to corporate governance.  
Section V addresses one of the key areas of controversy: the efficiency and viability of 
large conglomerate organisations which are ubiquitous in developing countries on all 
continents.  Should such organisations be forced to become more focused and shed 
their conglomerate characters?  Section VI- IX take up the question of competition 
policy as well as the nature of competition in developing countries. The following 
specific issues addressed in this section are: 
 
(a) What is the relationship between competition in the product and capital markets, 
and corporate governance? 
 
(b) How intense is the competition in product markets of emerging economies? How 
does this compare with competition in advanced countries? 
 
(c)  Do developing countries need a competition policy? Should this competition 
policy be the same as in advanced countries? If not, how should it be different? 
 
(d) Will competition policy in developing countries be adequate to cope with the 
implications of the gigantic international merger movement led by advanced 
country firms which is currently sweeping the world economy. 
 
Finally, Section X concludes and draws together implications for economic policy. 
 
 
 
II.  The Asian financial crisis and corporate governance 
 
The impetus behind the quest for a new international financial architecture came from 
the crisis which erupted in Thailand in July 1997 and quickly spread to other Asian 
economies.  Whereas previous crises had struck economies with a history of financial 
instability and low growth, such as Mexico in 1995, the Asian crisis devastated 
countries that were the fastest growing in the world economy and had solid 
achievements in technological upgrading and poverty reduction.  The international 
financial institutions and private commercial and investment banks had frequently 
cited them as prime examples of the benefits of export-led growth and the “market-
friendly” approach to development.   The shock among policymakers and market 
participants was therefore acute.   
 
After the initial shock of the crisis had worn off, however, an influential theory of the 
crisis emerged that argued that the deeper reasons of the crisis could be found in the 
institutional structures of the Asian model.  This view was succinctly conveyed by 
Larry Summers, then the US Treasury Under Secretary, who argued that the roots of 
the Asian financial crisis did not lie in bad policy management but in the nature of the 
economies themselves.  Summers stated that “[this crisis] is profoundly different 
because it has roots not in improvidence but in economic structures.  The problems 
that must be fixed are much more microeconomic than macroeconomic, and involve 
the private sector more and the public sector less (Financial Times, 20 February, 
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1998).”  This view was echoed in slightly different terms by the widely respected 
Chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan:  
 
[In the last decade or so, the world has observed] a consensus towards, 
for want of a better term, the Western form of free-market capitalism as 
the model which should govern how each individual country should run 
its economy…We saw the breakdown of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the 
massive shift away from central planning towards free market capitalist 
types of structures.  Concurrent to that was the really quite dramatic, 
very strong growth in what appeared to be a competing capitalist-type 
system in Asia.  And as a consequence of that, you had developments of 
types of structures, which I believe at the end of the day were faulty, but 
you could not demonstrate that so long as growth was going at 10 
percent a year. (Greenspan, 1998) 
 
This “structuralist” interpretation of the Asian crisis was highly influential in the 
design of the policy response of the International Monetary Fund.  As a consequence, 
the IMF conditioned its emergency loans on deep structural reforms that went far 
beyond the usual stabilisation measures, encompassing fundamental changes in labour 
regulations, corporate governance and the relationship between government and 
business.  The scope of the IMF’s conditionality prompted the conservative economist 
Martin Feldstein to argue that the IMF “should not use the opportunity to impose 
other economic changes that, however helpful they may be, are not necessary to deal 
with the balance of payments problem and are the proper responsibility of the 
country’s own political system (Feldstein, 1998).” 
 
In spite of such concerns, the “structuralist” interpretation has continued to underpin 
policy proposals and framed the academic debate on the issue.  This view consists of 
several interlinked arguments.  First, fragile financial systems resulted from 
relationship banking, weak corporate governance structures and lack of competition.  
Johnson et al. (2000) argue that measures of corporate governance and in particular 
the effectiveness of protection for minority shareholders, explain the extent of the 
exchange rate depreciation and stock market decline better than standard 
macroeconomic measures.  Furthermore, the crony-istic relations between financial 
institutions, business and the government shielded the system from market discipline 
and encouraged the over-investment that led to the crisis.  Second, and related to the 
first point, the high leverage ratios of Asian firms heightened their vulnerability and 
created the conditions that led to a sudden crisis.  Thirdly, the lack of transparency 
and the poor quality of information in such an insider-dominated system led to 
informational asymmetries that exacerbated the crisis.  Markets did not have adequate 
information about the true financial status of the corporations and the banks.  Thus, 
once the market began to assess the true facts, there was a collapse of confidence.  As 
the former managing director of the IMF, Michel Camdessus, argued: 
 
In Korea, for example, opacity had become systemic.  The lack of 
transparency about government, corporate and financial sector 
operations concealed the extent of Korea’s problems – so much so that 
corrective action came too late and ultimately could not prevent the 
collapse of market confidence, with the IMF finally being authorised to 
intervene just days before potential bankruptcy. (Speech to 
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Transparency International, reported in the IMF Survey, 9 February, 
1998). 
 
To remedy these alleged faults in the Asian system, reformers sought to dissolve the 
close links between the state and business, create an arm’s length relationship between 
banks and business and to promote greater transparency in economic relations. 
 
The “structuralist” interpretation is not, however, the only account of the Asian crisis, 
nor the most persuasive.  Singh and Weisse, (1999) have argued that the 
“structuralist” interpretation is not credible for several reasons.  First, it does not 
explain the previous exemplary success of the Asian economies.  As Paul Krugman 
has remarked: “But if the system was so flawed, why did it work so well for so long, 
then fail so suddenly?” (Krugman, 1999).  Second, it does not explain why countries 
such as China and, especially, India, with similar systems did not have a crisis.   
 
A more credible explanation of the crisis that encompasses these facts is that the 
afflicted economies dismantled their controls over the borrowing of the private sector 
and embraced financial liberalisation.  As a consequence, the private sector built up 
short-term foreign currency debt that often found its way into the non-tradable sector 
and into speculative real estate ventures.  Accompanying financial liberalisation was 
the irrational exuberance and contagion that are always latent in private international 
financial flows.  In sum, Singh and Weisseargue that the crisis occurred not because 
the Asian model has been flawed but precisely because it was not being followed.   
Thus, while Edmund Phelps identifies the crisis with the failure of Asian corporatism 
(Phelps, 1999), it can be argued that in reality this system underpinned the most 
successful industrialisation drive in history and dramatically reduced poverty.  The 
system, however, was vulnerable to the forces unleashed by financial liberalisation.  
 
In this paper, two key elements of the Greenspan-Summers “structuralist” 
interpretation will, inter alia, be examined in detail.  The first is the contention that 
there was poor corporate governance resulting from crony capitalism that, together 
with the lack of competition in product markets, led to a disregard of profits and 
hence to over-investment and, ultimately, to the crisis.   The following sections will 
outline the nature of the differences in the systems of corporate governance between 
developing and industrial countries, variations within each group, as well as 
implications for economic efficiency of these diverse systems/institutions.  Secondly, 
a later section will examine evidence on the intensity of competition in the product 
markets of Asian and other developing countries.  
 
III. The New International Financial Architecture and Corporate Governance 
 
In a move towards defining a New International Financial Architecture, the G-7 
assigned the task of reforming corporate governance to the OECD and the World 
Bank.  The main results so far of this initiative have been the following: 
(a) OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (see Appendix 1); 
(b) OECD/World Bank Compact on the Reform of Corporate Governance; 
(c) the Corporate Governance Forum meetings between officials and businessmen; 
(d) ‘self-assessment’ exercises in corporate governance carried out under the guidance 
of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank.  
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(e) the World Bank is organising investor surveys asking domestic and international 
investors the private sector’s response to the progress and credibility of reform. 
 
The five basic principles of corporate governance promoted by the OECD/World 
Bank initiative have been summarized in the World Bank’s main document on 
corporate governance, Corporate Governance: A Framework for Implementation 
(Iskander and Chamlou, 2000).  The study points out that the principles have been 
based on tenets of “fairness, transparency, accountability and responsibility”.      
 
Protection of shareholder rights to share in company profits, receive 
information about the company, and influence the firm through shareholder 
meetings and voting. 
 
Equitable treatment of shareholders, especially minority and foreign 
shareholders, with full disclosure of material information and prohibition of 
abusive self-dealing and insider trading. 
 
Protection of stakeholder rights as spelled out in contracts and in labour and 
insolvency laws, in a framework that allows stakeholder participation in 
performance-enhancing mechanisms, gives stakeholders access to relevant 
company information, and allows effective redress for violations of 
stakeholder rights. 
 
Timely and accurate disclosure and transparency on all matters material to 
company performance, as essential to market-based monitoring of companies, 
and shareholders’ ability to exercise voting rights, with accounting according 
to quality standards of disclosure and audit, and with objective auditing by 
independent assessors. 
 
Diligent exercise of the board of directors’ responsibilities to guide 
corporate strategy, to manage the firms’ executive functions (such as 
compensation, business plans, and executive employment), to monitor 
managerial performance and achieve an adequate return for investors, to 
implement systems for complying with applicable laws (tax, labour, 
competition, environment), to prevent conflicts of interest and to balance 
competing demands on the company, and with some independence from 
managers to consider the interests of all stakeholders in the company, treat 
them fairly, and give them access to information. 
 
The World Bank report does go to some lengths to point out that “there is no one-size-
fits-all blueprint for corporate governance”.  Furthermore, it explicitly states – 
although only in a footnote that can be found only by careful reading - that the Anglo-
Saxon model of corporate governance is not the model it seeks to impose elsewhere:  
The report does not advocate one form of ownership structure over 
another and certainly not the Anglo-US models.  These markets have 
developed over time in response to investor needs, institutional 
capacity and the investing preferences of the population.  They cannot 
be easily copied in other environments.  (footnote 1, p.53) 
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The report also states that the model should be prepared by each country according to 
the above principles and that it should be “nationally owned”.   
 
However, the entire thrust of the report’s arguments and its definition of “best 
practice” structures detailed in the appendices to the report, belies any assertion that 
the it treats the different models of corporate governance equally.  It is indeed hard to 
find much daylight between the report’s conception of “best practice” and the Anglo-
Saxon model of corporate governance, which leaves little doubt that it is the preferred 
system.  Furthermore, the genesis of the corporate governance project was a 
questionable analysis of the Asian crisis on which far-reaching policy proposals have 
been based.  The overarching theme of this orthodox analysis, as noted earlier, was 
one based on marketisation, arm’s-length relationships and transparency.   
 
The current “self-assessment” exercises under the guidance of the World Bank and 
the Asian Development Bank have already identified salient problems in corporate 
governance systems: lack of effective oversight by boards of directors, poor 
disclosure, weak compliance with regulatory and statutory requirements, tight insider 
control, and shareholder and creditor passivity.  Further results along these lines can 
be expected as the World Bank is organising investor surveys asking domestic and 
international investors the private sector’s response to the progress and credibility of 
reform.      
 
In summary, there is considerable activity in international fora with respect to 
identifying best practice codes for corporate governance.  Developing countries know 
from past experience that today’s best practice often becomes tomorrow’s 
conditionality if a country has the misfortune of requiring IMF assistance.  Advanced 
emerging markets in particular must, therefore, pro-actively engage in the proceedings 
of the Global Corporate Governance Forum and the Regional Corporate Governance 
Roundtables that the OECD and the World Bank are jointly organizing.  One reason 
for doing this is that the private sector which is involved in these activities in many 
countries does not appear to be fully appreciative of the subtle issues involved in 
examining the question of corporate governance.  It is not unusual to find that 
business school economists in private sector organisations in developing countries, 
who usually have a narrow view of the subject, put forward proposals for a market-
based system of stock market governance which are even more extreme than those 
suggested by the international financial institutions.
4
   
 
IV. Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets: the Facts 
 
The analysis of corporate governance structures in developing countries has long been 
hindered by a lack of detailed information.  One benefit to arise from the Asian crisis 
and the focus of the international financial institutions on governance structures has 
been the assembling of a large body of evidence on corporate governance structures in 
developing countries at the World Bank.  This has included information on the 
structure of share ownership and corporate governance laws.  Thus, we are now in a 
position to construct a more informed picture of the governance structures in a wide 
range of developing countries. 
 
                                                          
4
 See, for example, the document “Desirable Corporate Governance: A Code” published by the 
Confederation of Indian Industry (1998). 
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Patterns of share ownership and control of large corporations in developed and 
emerging markets 
 
One of the key insights to emerge from the new empirical studies is that the widely-
held corporation described in the classic study by Berle and Means, (1933) is an 
Anglo-Saxon phenomenon.  As Table 1 indicates, among developing countries, the 
share of family-controlled
5
 firms in the top 20 publicly-traded companies in Mexico, 
Hong Kong and Argentina are 100%, 70% and 65% respectively.  In contrast, in the 
U.K. the top 20 quoted companies are 100% widely-held.  However, among 
developed countries there is a diversity of structures.  In Sweden and Portugal, 45% of 
the top twenty publicly-traded firms are family-controlled, while in Greece and 
Belgium the figure is 50%.  Even in the United States the share of family-controlled, 
firms is 20% of the top 20 publicly traded firms.   
 
In terms of state ownership and control of large firms, the picture is similarly 
complex.  In Israel and Singapore, nearly half (40% and 45%, respectively) of the top 
20 publicly-traded firms were state controlled.  In the major OECD economies, this 
figure ranges from zero in the US and the U.K., to 25% in Germany and 40% in Italy.  
Among the smaller advanced economies there is a similar range, with Austrian state-
run corporations controlling a 70% share of the top 20 publicly-traded firms.  It is 
therefore not surprising that Russia now has a higher degree of private ownership than 
many Western European countries.   
 
Table 2 provides evidence from Asian countries assembled by Claessens et al., (2000) 
which is based on a very large sample of nearly 3,000 publicly-traded firms in nine 
countries.  It indicates that when 10% equity ownership is defined as control, Japan is 
the only country with the Berle and Means-style system of dispersed share ownership 
(42% of publicly-traded firms), but with an additional 38.5% of firms controlled by 
widely-held financial institutions.  At the 10% level, most other countries had systems 
dominated by families: Indonesia (68.6%), Korea (67.9%), Taiwan (65.6%), Malaysia 
(57.5%) and Thailand (56.5%).   When control is defined at the 20% level, the Berle 
and Means widely-held system becomes more pronounced, as many families in Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan have family ownership of between 10% and 20% of the equity.  
However, even after redefining control, family-controlled corporations still account 
for 48.4% of publicly-traded companies in Korea and 48.2% in Taiwan.  Moreover, in 
other countries the share of family-controlled firms (as a share of the total number of 
firms under ‘control’) increases with the redefinition of control.  In Indonesia the class 
of family-controlled firms increases at the expense of state, widely-held financial and 
widely-held corporate control.  In Thailand, family control increases from 57.7% to 
67.2% and in Malaysia from 57.7% to 67.2% with the change of definition for 
control. (Claessens et al., 2000, p.104).   
 
An interesting variant is provided by the typical pattern of share ownership and 
control in large Indian firms – the Business Groups.  Table 3 shows that for the top 
40, directors and the families held only 22.4 per cent of shares.  Financial institutions 
and banks held 27.9 per cent.  Since all these financial institutions were controlled by 
                                                          
5
 Note that control is defined as a 20% or higher share of equity.  
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the government and in many of these largest corporations the government had, 
effectively, a controlling shareholding.  However, traditionally, Indian financial 
institutions support the owning family unless the company performance was 
exceptionally poor. 
 
Evidence also suggests that in Asia firms controlled by families are most likely to 
have a separation between ownership and control.  Table 4 presents the mean-ratios of 
cash-flow over control rights for a sample of Asian economies.  A low ratio indicates 
that the control rights exceed the cash-flow rights and thus measure the degree of 
corporate “pyramiding”. The table indicates that in all countries except for Japan and 
Singapore, family-controlled firms have the most separation between ownership and 
control.  In Japan, firms controlled by financial institutions have the most separation 
(0.495).  The pattern across company size is less clear, but it appears that small firms 
are most likely to have a larger wedge between cash flow and control rights, 
regardless of the type of ownership.  In three countries, however, (Korea, Singapore 
and Taiwan), There is a greater separation of ownership and control among the twenty 
largest family-controlled firms. 
 
Crony capitalism 
Claessens et al., (2000) also present evidence (reported in Table 5) on the degree to 
which family-controlled firms account for GDP.  As noted earlier, the orthodox 
argument in the wake of the Asian crisis argued that “crony capitalism” – the complex 
of relationships between large family capitalists and their government allies – created 
the conditions for economic collapse.  However, the evidence indicates that there is no 
direct link between the share of GDP controlled by family firms and performance.  In 
Hong Kong, the top 15 families controlled 84.2 percent of GDP in 1996 while in 
Singapore and Malaysia the respective figures were 48.3% and 76.2%.  Hong Kong 
and Singapore were both able to weather the financial crisis in Asia in 1997 while the 
Malaysia experienced a sharp downturn and currency crash.  Similarly, Taiwan’s top 
15 families control 17% of GDP and the country avoided the financial crisis while the 
top 15 families in Korea account for 12.9% of GDP and country experienced a sharp 
contraction and currency depreciation in late 1997 and early 1998.  Thus, crony 
capitalism, while it certainly exists, cannot be reduced simplistically to the extent of 
influence of family-controlled groups in the economy.   
 
A similar story applies when we measure the influence of the top 15 families by their 
ownership of corporate assets, although in this case the top 15 families control 38.4% 
of the corporate assets in Korea compared to 20.1% in Taiwan (this, however, reflects 
the more concentrated industrial structure in Korea and the dominance of large firms 
in its stock market).  It should be noted that such concentrations of economic power in 
a set of families is not necessarily antithetical to the efficient functioning, 
transparency and democratic accountability of the industrial system, as the case of the 
highly influential Wallenberg family in Sweden indicates.  It is believed that the 
Wallenberg’s control up to 60% of Sweden’s industrial capital, and consequently, 
little is done in the country which does not have their approval.  Furthermore, as 
Berglof and von Thadden note, crony capitalism is not a corporate governance 
problem in a strict sense since family owners are likely to have the right incentives in 
their firms (Berglof and von Thadden, 1999).  Crony capitalism is rather a product of 
the complex of relations between the business and political elites and could in 
principle arise in systems with widely dispersed ownership.  Taken collectively, the 
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prevalence of family-controlled firms in developing counties suggests that they are an 
effective vehicle of late development and industrialisation and that they remain 
prominent in many advanced economies.
6
                  
 
 
V.  The Theoretical  Foundations of the OECD/World Bank Proposals on 
Corporate Governance 
 
The World Bank’s preference for the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance is 
based on what they regard as “best practice”.   Conspicuously, it is not based on 
systematic theoretical analysis or rigorous empirical research.   However, a recent 
series of papers by Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Schleifer and 
Robert Vishny (hereafter referred to as LLSV) on law and finance has helped fill 
these theoretical and empirical lacunae.   
 
The LLSV thesis 
The central proposition of the by now fairly extensive literature generated by LLSV 
and their colleagues is that there is a systematic causal relationship between the legal 
framework, the corporate financing patterns, corporate behaviour and performance, 
and overall economic growth.
7
  More specifically, it argues that the greater the 
protection afforded to minority shareholders and creditors, the more external 
financing firms will be able to obtain.  Through a variety of mechanisms this greater 
access to external finance modifies corporate behaviour and improves performance, 
which then has a positive impact on aggregate economic growth.   
 
The LLSV analysis is based on an empirical and theoretical evaluation of different 
legal systems whose historical origins are exogenous (or, in the case of LDCs, they 
are a legacy of colonial rule).  The studies differentiate between four types of law 
systems: Anglo-Saxon “common law” (as practiced in the US and other former 
British colonies), French “civil law”, and German and Scandinavian legal traditions 
(which are in general closer to the French “civil law” tradition).  The main analysis 
focuses on the differences between the common and civil law traditions.   
 
A distinguishing characteristic of these contributions is their strong empirical 
emphasis.  The empirical results presented by LLSV indicate that the predictions of 
the legal origin model are verified by the data. Specifically, they argue that the lack of 
protection for minority shareholders, as is the case in the French civil law countries, 
leads to concentration of share ownership, a point that the data indicate is correct.  
Similarly, they suggest that other things being equal, corporations in common law 
countries pay out more dividends and have higher share prices than firms in civil law 
countries.  In addition, the evidence – in conformity with the theory – indicates that 
there has been a faster development of stock markets under a common law legal 
system than under the civil law system.  In point of fact, however, their claim is even 
more ambitious: that the legal system provides a better classification of countries  than 
the distinction between “bank-based” and “stock market-based” financial systems.   
 
Table 6 provides data on the origins of the legal system and investor rights in 49 
countries from the LLSV sample.  Panels A and B provide measures of shareholder 
                                                          
6
   See further the discussion in the next section as well as Amsden (1989, 2000). 
7
 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000. 
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and creditor protection, respectively, while Panel C reports measures of enforcement 
capability.  It is evident from the table that there are clear differences in all these 
spheres between the common law and civil law countries.  Specifically, the evidence 
reported indicates that civil law countries have low accounting standards, more 
corruption, less efficient judicial systems and poor protection for creditors and 
shareholders.  These reported inefficiencies, it is argued, lead to poor corporate 
governance and lower economic growth.   
 
The policy implication that LLSV draw from this analysis is that countries should 
move toward the more efficient common law system based on transparency and arm’s 
length relationships.  It is argued, however, that this would not be easy given the 
vested interests connected with concentrated share ownership who could frustrate any 
government attempt to dilute their equity stakes.  Governments are therefore advised 
to carry out the reforms in a much more indirect and subtle way that challenges the 
influence of the conglomerates.   
 
The Berglof and von Thadden Critique 
 
There are two significant lines of criticism that can be directed against this body of 
thought.  The first, articulated by  Berglof and von Thadden,(1999) finds the 
theoretical framework presented in LLSV far too limited for examining corporate 
governance issues in developing countries.  At an empirical level, they argue that the 
LLSV characterization of corporate governance in these countries is not only too 
narrow but also misleading.   
 
The focus of the analysis on protecting minority shareholders and creditors is too 
narrow, Berglof and von Thadden contend, to be even applied to most European 
countries, let alone developing countries.  LLSV appear to be solely interested in the 
question of the protection of providers of external finance to the exclusion of other 
significant stakeholders in the firm.  In particular, there is no mention of labour laws 
or the equally vital relationships between workers and managers, suppliers and 
owners/managers, local communities and the corporation as well as the government 
and the corporation.  In effect, all these relationships are ignored while the protection 
of external financing is placed, alone, in the centre of the analysis.  Thus, any sense of 
the structures in which the firm is embedded and which determine its performance and 
competitiveness is expunged from consideration and we are led to place a 
disproportionate weight to one - potentially small - aspect of this structure.  Berglof 
and von Thadden do not regard external finance as the only, or even the principal, 
constraint on firm growth (see, however, Section VI on this point).  
 
Berglof and von Thadden also note that the reference point for the LLSV study is the 
widely-held, Berle and Means-type corporation which is prevalent mainly in the 
United States and the United Kingdom (as was indicated by the analysis in section 
IV).  In the developing country context, they point out that the LLSV paradigm is 
valid and relevant only for the case of transitional economies, which is not entirely 
surprising given the fact that some of the LLSV authors were intimately involved in 
Russian reforms in the 1990s.  The former Russian state-owned sector has been 
dominated by owners/managers who have benefited from insider privatisations and 
who have often effectively expropriated outside investors who often have to play a 
central role in the implementation of painful restructuring (Berglof and von Thadden, 
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p.24).  In this context, Berglof and von Thadden argue, improved investor protection 
can be very useful in attracting outside capital and forcing restructuring.   
 
The typical firm in developing countries, however, is a family-controlled or closely-
held by block holders, i.e. it has concentrated share ownership.  The important 
corporate governance problem for this class of firms is not legal protection for outside 
shareholders but rather the problems of family succession and maintaining family 
control while raising funds from outside investors.   
 
The LLSV argument is also susceptible to the fact that the direction of causality 
between legal system and financial structure could run in either direction.  The legal 
system may lead to the formation of a certain financial structure, as LLSV maintain, 
but it is at least equally plausible that the financial structure may also lead to the 
creation of legal norms.  In the latter view, the law accommodates larger structural 
changes taking place in the economy, financial markets and politics.  To therefore 
argue, as LLSV do, for the primacy of legal origins in financial market development 
is to place the cart before the horse.     
 
It is important to note that even on its own terms, maximising investor protection 
cannot be optimal.  It will result in the dilution of efficiency advantages deriving from 
the lower agency costs of concentrated ownership.  A system which is also more 
oriented towards investor protection may also lead to familiar problems of short-
termism which often characterise firms in the Anglo-Saxon stock market economies 
which result in lower levels of investment and an emphasis on financial engineering 
(Cosh, Hughes and Singh, 1990; Porter, 1992; Singh, 2000).    
 
The Glen, Lee and Singh analysis 
The second and rather different critical line of argument against the central LLSV 
thesis has been presented by Glen, Lee and Singh (2000).  They suggest that over the 
past 20 years there have been major changes in corporate financing patterns and in 
stock market development in emerging markets.  It would be difficult to attribute 
these enormous variations, as detailed below, to changes in corporate law or to legal 
origin.  This will be illustrated by considering the specific experience of India, a pre-
eminently common law based country.  Despite this fact, in accordance with political 
decisions of the Indian leadership the stock market up to 1980 played hardly any role 
in the economy.  Stock market capitalisation as a proportion of GDP was a mere 5 
percent until then.  The government began a change in its economic policy stance in 
the early 1980s and began to implement financial liberalisation internally.  However, 
following the balance of payments and liquidity crisis of 1990-1991, the government 
initiated a more full-scale internal as well as external liberalisation.  The net result 
was that there was a stock market boom.  Total market capitalisation rose from 5% in 
1980 to 13% in 1990 and to 40% in 1993.  There were two million mutual fund 
investors in India in 1980 but by 1995 there were over 40 million, second only to the 
US.  The number of companies listed on the Indian stock markets rose to nearly 
8,000, a figure bigger than that for the US, the largest developed country market.  
Hundreds of companies made IPOs as well as a large number of existing listed 
companies raised fresh equity finance on the stock market.   
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These enormous changes in stock market development and financing of Indian 
corporations occurred in a brief space of time without any fundamental changes in 
India’s constitution or basic legal framework (see Singh, 1998a).   
 
India, however, is not a special case.  Other emerging markets (for example, Taiwan, 
Mexico, Thailand and Malaysia) in the 1980s also recorded enormous increases in 
stock market activity in the wake of financial liberalisation.  Again, this was not a 
response to changes in the basic legal framework from a civil law to a common law 
regime (Singh, 1997; Singh and Weisse, 1998).  Rather it was the result of the 
deliberate change in economic policy.  Laws were changed to accommodate economic 
policy decisions without altering their fundamental framework.  Obviously, there will 
be examples of the opposite kind where the legal framework has led changes in 
economic institutions.  There is thus likely to be a mutually interactive relationship 
between laws and economic policy.  LLSV greatly overstate their case by asserting a 
one-way causal relationship.   
 
The LLSV legal origin approach is thus unable to account for the huge changes in 
corporate financing patterns and stock market development within emerging markets 
over time.  So that even if we accepted that legal origin may explain some of the 
cross-sectional variations between developing countries, it is not helpful in explaining 
the much more important structural changes that have been taking place in emerging 
markets over the last two decades.   
 
Finally, the LLSV analysis also requires us to accept that countries with a civil law 
tradition and, consequently, less protection for outside investors, have been either 
willing to accept or ignorant of the economic costs of their legal system.  If they had 
been rational, Germany and France would have imported a common law system 
decades ago and even experienced higher rates of growth.  In view of the fact that 
over the last century economic growth in Japan and Germany was faster and that of 
France was comparable to those in the Anglo-Saxon economies, such an argument 
strains credulity.
8
  
 
VI.  Corporate governance and corporate finance in emerging markets 1990s 
versus 1980s 
  
                                                          
8
 For a comparison of growth rates in advanced economies, see Maddison (1991).  The comparison 
above was based on Table 3.1 on p.49.  French growth over the period 1870-1989 was 1.8% (annual 
average compound growth rate), which compares favourably with the U.K. (1.4%) and the US (1.8%). 
The argument in the text applies only to the LLSV thesis in its strong ahistorical form.  The thesis can 
be expressed in a weaker version which would state that the Anglo-Saxon form of corporate 
governance is most conducive to growth under certain historical circumstances, but not in others.  
However, LLSV do not explicitly make any such historical distinction.  
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The last section touched on issues of corporate finance in the context of a critique of 
the LLSV approach to law and finance.  Here we shall report more directly on 
corporate financing patterns in developing countries.  As is implicit in the previous 
discussion, there is a close relationship between corporate governance and corporate 
finance.  Indeed, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define corporate governance in terms of 
the rules and procedures which ensures that external investors and creditors in a 
company can get their money back and will not simply be expropriated by those who 
are managing the company. 
 
Two of the first large-scale empirical studies of the financing of corporate growth in 
emerging markets were Singh and Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995) (henceforward, 
both studies will be referred to as S-H).  The two studies arrived at surprising 
conclusions.  One would have expected, a priori, that because of the 
underdevelopment and imperfections of developing country capital markets, firms in 
these countries would largely be self-financing.  However, these two studies produced 
results that were quite contrary to these expectations.  Large developing country 
firms, it was found, depended overwhelmingly on external rather than internal 
finance, and used equity financing to a surprisingly large degree (see Table 7).  
 
Table 7 suggests that during the 1980s the average company among the 100 largest 
listed manufacturing firms in each country, in a sample of ten emerging markets, 
financed merely 40 per cent of its growth of net assets from retained profits.  About 
60 per cent of corporate growth in the sample of emerging markets was financed by 
external sources – 40 per cent from new equity capital and 20 per cent from long-term 
debt.  Even though the equity financing figures were to some extent overstated by 
virtue of the fact that an indirect method of estimation was used (on account of lack of 
direct information), these figures were much larger than might have been expected a 
priori.
9
 In advanced economies with well-developed capital markets, the typical large 
firm is thought to follow a ‘pecking order’ in which most of the needed finance for 
growth us obtained from retained profits.  If additional resources are required, the firm 
would borrow funds and only as a last resort would it issue new shares in the equity 
market. 
 
 
In explaining these results for emerging markets, Singh (1995a) hypothesized that the 
much greater recourse to external finance in developing country corporations was due 
to the faster growth of these firms relative to those in advanced countries and 
therefore had a greater need for external capital.  On the supply side, such finance was 
forthcoming at least for the large developing country firms through government-
directed finance, while it was the small firms that faced credit rationing.  However, he 
explained the surprisingly high use of equity finance in conjunctural terms:   
 
a) the direct role of the governments in stimulating stock market development 
in many emerging countries so as to facilitate privatisation; 
b) external and internal financial liberalisation which often lead both to a 
stock market boom and to higher real interest rates; the former lowered the 
cost of equity capital whilst the latter increased the cost of debt finance. 
 
                                                          
9
 For a fuller discussion of these measurement biases see Whittington, Saporta and Singh (1997). 
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Singh suggested that once these temporary factors cease to operate, the situation 
would revert to the normal low levels of equity financing.  Most of the factors that 
lead corporations in advanced economies to avoid new share issues, such as 
asymmetric information apply, mutatis mutandis, to developing countries as well.  In 
addition, the desire of wealthy families in developing countries to retain control over 
large firms also militates against the use of equity finance.  Similarly, the greater 
volatility of share prices observed, as well as expected, in developing country stock 
markets should discourage the use of equity finance.  
 
Have the corporate financing patterns in emerging markets changed in the 1990s 
compared with the 1980s?  If so, have they changed in the direction indicated above – 
that is, do they suggest that the conjunctural factors have ceased to operate or are less 
applicable?  Tables 8, 9a and 9b attempt to answer this question for four emerging 
markets.  The tables are based on the WorldScope dataset for individual listed 
corporations for four countries, India, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand.  The dataset 
provides information for only the 1990s so that a direct comparison of these results to 
those of Singh (1995) and Singh and Hamid (1992) for the 1980s must be made 
carefully and with due regard to the intrinsic differences in the datasets. 
 
Specifically, the WorldScope dataset makes it possible to measure the extent of equity 
financing directly instead of using the indirect residual method employed in the S-H 
studies because of data limitations.  The new dataset also allows us to undertake a 
more comprehensive analysis of sources of financing for corporate growth including 
both short- and long-term debt and working capital.  The S-H studies only examined 
long-term debt which in the case of developing countries, as subsequent events 
demonstrated, is not an adequate reflection of their normal indebtedness.  This is 
because developing country corporations use large amounts of short-term debt for 
long-term investment purposes.  Such debt is normally rolled over, turning it into the 
functional equivalent of long-term debt, but creditors may refuse to roll over these 
debts in crisis situations, as exemplified by the Asian crisis of 1997-1998.  Therefore, 
the results reported in Table 8 are based on a methodology that differs from that of S-
H in the following respects: 
 
(a) By measuring the contributing of equity finance directly (as noted above, the 
WorldScope data provides that information); 
(b) By including short-term debt as well as trade credit in external sources of finance.  
The earlier studies were only concerned with long-term capital employed in the 
firm i.e. the growth of net assets.  The exercise in Table 8 includes all sources of 
finance -–short term as well as long term. 
(c) By including another category for revaluation reserves, minority interests, 
preferred shares and non-equity reserves. 
 
The results in Table 8 confirm the main S-H result that developing country firms 
depend overwhelming on external finance to finance their growth.  As expected, the 
contribution of external financing is, if anything, greater than in the S-H studies 
because of the inclusion of short-term debt and working capital in the sources of 
finance.  In Korea, for example, nearly 95 per cent of the total sources of finance 
consisted of external finance; in Thailand the corresponding figure was 89 per cent; in 
Malaysia and India, it was 75 and 80 per cent respectively.  The contribution of short-
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term debt to total sources of finance is also striking, ranging as it does from just under 
30 per cent in India to well over 45 per cent in Korea. 
 
However, the results for the equity financing variables are more mixed.  Although 
only a rough comparison can be made, the results show reduced equity financing in 
some countries in the 1990s compared with the 1980s, and increasing equity financing 
in others.  In the case of India, there is a ten percentage point increase in the 
contribution of new share issues to total sources of finance between the 1980s and 
1990s.  In Malaysia and Korea the proportions contributed by new share issues is 
smaller than in the S-H studies.  Nevertheless, in both countries, the contributions of 
new share capital is more than 15 per cent which, contrary to the pecking order theory 
is greater than the share of retained profits (it is of course well above the figure 
attributed to new share issues in advanced economies (Mayer, 1990; Corbett and 
Jenkinson, 1994). 
 
The question remains whether the above results can be attributed entirely to the biased 
measurement of the equity financing variable in the benchmark S-H studies for the 
1980s.  To investigate this, both the Singh and Hamid residual method and the direct 
method were used to calculate the financing of net assets (i.e., the long-term capital 
employed in the firm) in a sample of four countries over the 1992-1996 period.  The 
results reported in Tables 9a and 9b show that the direct method and the S-H residual 
method produce broadly similar results.  For both India and Korea, the residual 
method slightly underestimated the contribution of equity finance while in the case of 
Malaysia it significantly overestimated its contribution.  In the case of Thailand, both 
methods arrived at identical results.  This analysis therefore suggests that in three out 
of four countries, the S-H method did not overstate the contribution of equity finance.  
Thus, in the case of these countries, the observed changes in the corporate financing 
patterns from the 1980s to the 1990s are likely to reflect the substantive factors 
discussed earlier rather than measurement bias.  
 
It is useful to discuss the Indian example where we observed a modest increase in 
equity financing in the 1990s compared to the benchmark figure in Table 8.  The early 
1990s saw the acceleration of the liberalisation reforms, both financial and non-
financial, in the wake of the balance of payments crisis of 1991.  A subsequent stock 
market boom resulted in increasing price/earnings ratios and consequently a lower 
cost of equity finance relative to debt (as interest rates rose modestly during the 
period).  More companies went to the stock market for finance, with 700 companies 
making IPOs in 1995-1996.  By 1999, which is of course well beyond the period of 
the WorldScope data examined in this study, IPOs had declined to almost zero as the 
stock market declined and price/earnings ratios fell.  
 
Corporate finance, the stock market and corporate governance 
In view of the large recourse to equity financing by developing country firms, it 
would appear that the stock markets might be expected to significantly affect their 
behaviour and their corporate governance patterns.  It is therefore important to ask 
how this pattern of corporate finance affects corporate governance.  The stock market 
can affect corporate governance and behaviour either directly through movements in 
share prices, or, more indirectly, through the market for corporate control.  We 
examine each of these in turn below.  
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It is clear from the pattern of finance that stock markets may be expected to have a 
significant influence on large developing country corporations because of the scale of 
finance they obtain from these markets.  Whether or not this is positive or negative 
development depends to a large extent on the position one takes with regard to the 
ability of the stock market to efficiently finance corporations.  In traditional textbook 
treatments of the subject, the liquid secondary equity market results in a better 
allocation of funds that results in more efficient and dynamic firms obtaining capital 
at lower cost.  Similarly, less efficient firms or firms in less dynamic industries face a 
higher cost of equity capital.  The result is the movement of funds to more efficient, 
productive firms that results in higher degrees of technological progress and economic 
growth.  
 
However, a more critical literature originating in the work of John Maynard Keynes 
has pointed out that the pricing process may not be as efficient as the textbooks 
suggest, but may instead be dominated by speculation.  James Tobin has distinguished 
two concepts of share price efficiency on the stock market: informational efficiency 
(in the sense that all currently available information is incorporated into the share 
price) and fundamental valuation efficiency (share prices must accurately reflect the 
future discounted earnings of the corporation).  While real world stock market prices 
may reflect the former, the critical school maintains that there are strong reasons to 
doubt that it attains the latter, more important, criterion of efficiency.  The reasons for 
this are found in the psychology of stock market participants.
10
  As Keynes pointed 
out in his famous description of the beauty contest in the General Theory, often the art 
of the successful investor does not consist in appreciating fundamental values of 
corporations, but rather in guessing at the likely movements of other stock market 
participants.  Such a process leads to herding, myopia and fads that can lead stock 
market values to diverge significantly from underlying values (for a current example, 
note the rise and fall of technology shares on international stock markets).  The 
volatility associated with this process further reduces the capacity of share prices to 
transmit efficient signals to market participants.   
 
Experience from advanced countries suggests that the stock market may also 
encourage managers to pursue short-term profits at the expense of long-term 
investment since firms are obliged to meet quarterly or half-yearly earnings per share 
targets determined by market expectations. Any serious fall in performance will 
quickly be reflected in a lower share price making the firm vulnerable to takeover.  In 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, numerous analysts in the United States ascribed that 
country’s relatively poor comparative performance vis-à-vis competitors with bank-
based financial systems such as Japan and Germany to the short-termist demands of 
Wall Street resulting in lower investment in technological upgrading and new 
capacity.
11
  In a closely related but more general sense, the dominance of stock 
markets can also result in the ascendancy of finance over productive enterprise.  The 
rules of the game are constructed in such a way that companies can rise or fall 
depending on their ability to engage in financial engineering rather than in developing 
new products or processes.  This is often reflected within the firm itself in the 
dominance of managers trained in finance over those who come from other 
backgrounds such as engineering or marketing.   
                                                          
10
 Benjamin Graham, in his classic work on security analysis noted that "The stock market is a voting 
machine rather than a weighing machine." (Graham, 1934,p.452). 
11
 See collection of studies in Porter 1992. 
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Thus, the benefits of having large corporations dependent on a highly liquid equity 
market are far from being unambiguous, particularly from the perspective of good 
corporate governance (see further Bhide, 1994). 
 
Corporate governance and takeovers 
The market for corporate control is thought to be the evolutionary endpoint of stock 
market development.  The ability of an outside group of investors to acquire a 
corporation, often through a hostile bid, is the hallmark of the stock market dominated 
US and U.K. financial systems.  As noted above, the textbook interpretation of 
takeovers is that they improve efficiency by transferring corporate assets to those who 
can manage them more productively.  Consequently, more effective managers emerge 
who can raise the firm’s profitability and share price.  Even if current managers are 
not replaced, an active market for corporate control presents a credible threat that 
inefficient managers will be replaced and thus ensures that the incumbent 
management actively seeks to maximize shareholder value and thereby raises 
corporate performance.  Even if quoted firms were not directly susceptible to changes 
in share prices because they finance themselves almost exclusively from internal 
finance (as the pecking order theory implies and empirical evidence on developed 
country corporations confirms), the market for corporate control can still discipline 
managers.  Furthermore, even if all firms are on the efficiency frontier, the 
amalgamation of some through the act of takeovers may lead to a better social 
allocation of resources via synergy.  
 
However, a critical school has developed a multifaceted critique that has increasingly 
questioned the above textbook version of the market for corporate control.  First, a 
number of analysts in the critical school have pointed out that in the real world the 
market for corporate control, even in advanced economies, has an inherent flaw in its 
operation: it is far easier for a large firm to take over a small one than the other way 
around (Singh, 1971, 1975, 1992).  In principle, it is possible that a small efficient 
firm may take over a larger and less efficient company (and to a degree this occurred 
in the US takeover wave of the 1980s through “junk bonds”), its incidence is very 
small (Hughes, 1989).      
 
This consideration is particularly important for developing countries like India where 
there are large, potentially predatory conglomerate groups (Singh, 1995).  These could 
take over smaller, more efficient firms and thereby reduce potential competition to the 
detriment of the real economy.  In a takeover battle it is the absolute firepower 
(absolute size) that counts rather than the relative efficiency.  Therefore, the 
development of an active market for corporate control may encourage managers to 
“empire-build” not only to increase their monopoly power but also to progressively 
shield themselves from takeover by becoming larger (see further Singh, 1975, 1992). 
 
Secondly, the efficient operation of the takeover mechanism requires that enormous 
amounts of information are widely available.  Specifically, market participants require 
information on the profitability of corporations under their existing management and 
what its prospective profitability would be under an alternative management if it were 
taken over.  It has been noted that such information is not easily available even in 
advanced countries and this informational deficit is likely to be greater in developing 
countries.   
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Thirdly, takeovers are a very expensive way of changing management (Peacock and 
Bannock, 1991).  There are huge transactions costs associated with takeovers in 
countries like the US and UK which hinder the efficiency of the takeover mechanism.  
Given the lower income levels in the developing countries, these costs are likely to be 
proportionally heavier in these countries.  It should also be borne in mind that highly 
successful countries such as Japan, Germany and France have not had an active 
market for corporate control and have thus avoided these costs, while still maintaining 
systems for disciplining managers.  Furthermore, there is no evidence that corporate 
governance necessarily improves after takeovers.  This is for the simple reason that all 
takeovers are not disciplinary; in many of them the acquiring firm is motivated by 
empire-building considerations or even by asset-stripping..   
 
Fourthly, there is theoretical work (see for example Stein, 1989) which suggests that 
even if managers wish to maximise shareholder wealth, it would pay them to be 
myopic in a world of takeovers and signal-jamming.  Thus, takeovers could 
exacerbate the already present tendencies towards short-termism in a stock market-
based system. 
 
Fifthly, it has been argued that takeovers can be used as a device to avoid honouring 
implicit contracts developed between workers and the former management (Shleifer 
and Summers, 1988).  This abandonment of implicit contracts can be argued to be 
socially harmful in that it discourages the accumulation of firm-specific human capital 
by workers.  The absence of strong worker-protection laws in many developing 
countries means that such considerations may be significant. 
 
These critiques of the market for corporate control have been based on the experience 
of advanced countries.  There is every reason to believe, however, that they are likely 
to be even more relevant to potential takeover markets in developing countries.  
However, the takeover market in developing countries remains rudimentary because 
of the fact, noted earlier, that shareholding is not widely dispersed and standards of 
disclosure are not conducive to takeovers.  It is therefore not surprising that hostile 
takeovers are rare in developing countries: e.g. in the last decade in India there have 
only been five or six such takeover attempts, not all of which were successful.  
However, this situation may change if large international MNCs are allowed to 
engage in takeovers in developing countries.  Domestic firms, with their limited funds 
and relatively restricted access to international capital markets, would not be able to 
either compete or resist the MNCs.  In addition, as we will discuss later, the entry of 
large MNCs in the takeover market may reduce competition in product markets in 
these countries. 
 
There are also other potential factors that could lead financial liberalisation and stock 
markets to have a negative effect on corporate governance.  Financial liberalisation 
establishes a strong link between two potentially volatile markets, the stock market 
and the foreign exchange market.  The Asian crisis of 1997-1998 demonstrated that 
there could be a strong negative feedback relationship between a falling stock market 
and a depreciating currency.  As the stock market declines, investors pull out of the 
market and move their funds into foreign currency.  The depreciating currency, in 
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turn, lowers real returns on the stock market which in turn propels the cycle.
12
  Such a 
collapse in currency and equity values of course, ultimately may encourage “fire-sale-
type FDI” in the form of takeovers, (suggesting that the expected rate of return 
measured in foreign currency has increased sufficiently due to the steep decline in 
domestic share prices).  This may overturn quite successful corporate governance 
structures and replace them with ones that are less suited.        
 
Developing Country Corporations and High Gearing 
It has been frequently observed that companies in developing countries are highly 
geared by international standards.  This observation is dependent on what definition of 
gearing is used.  If the ratio of long-term debt to equity is used, developing country 
indebtedness ratios are not high.  However, if the more encompassing ratio of total 
debt to total equity is used, the gearing of developing country corporations is high (see 
Table 10).  This reflects the extensive use of more easily available short-term debt by 
many developing country corporations to finance their often rapid growth.  In the 
wake of the Asian crisis and the evidence that the large amount of short-term debt 
contracted by conglomerates - particularly in Korea, but also in the other affected 
economies - had increased the vulnerability of these countries to a reversal of capital 
flows, the international financial institutions and governments have been calling for a 
reduction in gearing ratios.  It should be remembered, however, that it is possible, a 
priori, to use high gearing ratios to improve performance (by creating an optimal 
contract that bridges the agency problem between owners and managers) and also 
serves to enable the creation of conglomerates in the first place.  This is important 
since, as will be discussed in the next section, large conglomerates are instrumentally 
effective in late developing countries.   
 
The key question at the heart of this issue is what defines the optimal degree of 
gearing.  In theoretical terms this is not difficult – the optimal gearing ratio is the one 
that maximises shareholder value.  Empirically, however, this is very difficult to 
determine. 
 
It has also been argued that high gearing ratios are only possible because the 
conglomerates themselves are considered by the state as “too big too fail” and so do 
not have to bear the cost of financial distress.  However, this overlooks the 
mechanism by which discipline was instilled in the system.  A failing conglomerate in 
Korea was not simply dissolved through the market (which might not place a value on 
the firm) but was rather taken over by another conglomerate.  The conglomerate thus 
ceased to have an independent existence and the managers who ran it were dismissed.  
Again, in markets which are incomplete such a mechanism is efficient and reduces the 
losses associated with completely dissolving the conglomerate.  These countries have 
maintained high growth rates despite such supposedly “inefficient” practices.  In the 
wake of the Asian crisis there has been a chorus of calls for the establishment of an 
effective bankruptcy code in these countries.  Given that capital account liberalisation 
has increased the presence of foreign banks and investors in Asian corporations, such 
a development is probably necessary.  However, it does not answer the important 
question of which bankruptcy code to establish.  Bankruptcy codes are very different 
                                                          
12
  Of course, there is also a positive feedback loop between the two markets, with higher 
stock market valuations leading to capital inflows and an appreciating exchange rate.  It is 
thus possible that a stock market bubble will lead to an overvalued real exchange rate that in 
turn affects the competitiveness of the tradeable sector. 
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throughout the OECD and developing countries will have to examine them closely to 
see which one is most effective in their individual circumstances. 
 
 
 
However, high gearing ratios entail both benefits and costs for the firm.  High ratios 
can help alleviate the agency problem that exists between owners and managers by 
compelling the latter to work harder to improve profitability and productivity.  
Furthermore, high gearing ratios also allow families that are reluctant to issue new 
equity to retain control of companies.  Under normal circumstances, high gearing 
ratios do not present many problems since short-term debt is almost rolled over, 
making it the functional equivalent of long-term debt.  However, as the Asian crisis of 
1997-1998 demonstrated, high levels of debt can also be a source of vulnerability, 
especially if it has a short maturity structure and is denominated in foreign currency.  
In principle, this problem should be attenuated if the debt is contracted in local 
currency because the central bank can expand the money supply to reduce the real 
financing burden of the corporate sector.    
 
VII.  Conglomerates and Economic Efficiency 
 
Another issue closely connected with corporate governance and corporate finance in 
emerging markets is that of large family-owned conglomerates – an organisational 
form which is ubiquitous in the developing world.  These have been blamed for the 
Asian crisis because of their lack of transparency, poor corporate governance, and 
inadequate accounting procedures and for not being focused.  The owners are thought 
to be more interested in empire building than in pursuing share-holder value.  It is also 
suggested that the giant third world conglomerates, or the business groups, are 
regarded by the governments as being ‘too big to fail’, leading to moral hazard. The 
high gearing ratios of developing country conglomerates, such as those in Korea, are 
thought to reflect the cronyistic relationship between corporations, banks and the 
government. The business groups often have an in-house banks which it is alleged are 
used by the controlling families to undertake risky debt financed projects, or to create 
over-capacity.   
 
This is however a partial, one-sided picture of Business Groups in developing 
countries that ignores the most recent theoretical and empirical research on the 
subject.  It also overlooks the salient point that such firms have been playing the 
leading role in emerging markets in all continents notwithstanding the differences in 
institutional structures, cultures and government economic policies. Economic policy 
towards developing country conglomerates needs to be based on a full comprehension 
of their specificity rather than simply applying the lessons of diversified firms in the 
U.K. and the US.   
 
The other side of the story is provided by Amsden (1989 and 2000), in a series of 
papers by Khanna and Palepu (notably 1997, 1999), and Khanna and Yafeh (2000) as 
well as the earlier work of other scholars (see for example Leff, 1978, 1979).  These 
scholars point out important differences between the third world conglomerates and 
their western counterparts.  The latter, particularly in the US, were products of the 
huge takeover movements of the 1960s.  At that time, the Anglo-Saxon stock markets 
convinced themselves that conglomerates added value: they became the glamour 
stocks of the period.  However, the subsequent lacklustre performance of 
 26 
conglomerate firms led by the mid-1980s to stock market opinion moving decisively 
against these diversified firms. The same market professionals and investment banks 
who made money on assembling these conglomerates in the 1960s through the 
takeover process now profited from dissembling these through the same process – 
what Scherer (1988) called the “bustup” takeovers.  Ignoring the social cost of these 
obvious mistakes of the stock markets,
13
 the significant point is that developing 
country conglomerates are a different breed: they are normally not products of 
takeovers but in fact have usually grown and diversified organically.  Many of them 
are, however, engaged in such a wide variety of products and industries, with no 
apparent technological connections between them, that they have been rightly called 
idiosyncratic conglomerates.
14
  Historically, there were diversified firms in today’s 
advanced countries as well during the course of their economic development.  
However, this diversification was usually limited to the technologically closely related 
industries (Chandler, 1977, and Amsden and Hikino,1994).  The emerging market 
conglomerates are diversified far beyond such technological linkages. 
 
Alice Amsden (1989, 2000) regards Korean chaebols as the engines of Korea’s 
industrial development and of its enormous success in international markets.  Khanna 
and Palepu in their papers cited earlier provide the theoretical rationale as to why 
these big business groups maybe more successful in emerging markets than in 
developed countries. Their argument is straightforward. Developing countries suffer 
from a large number of market deficiencies. They have incomplete or missing product 
markets, as well as those for labour and capital, far more so than would be the case in 
advanced countries.  In addition, emerging markets do not yet have the whole gamut 
of information gathering and disseminating private organisations, regulatory 
institutions, professional bodies, all of which constitute the economic, social and legal 
institutional framework within which advanced country markets are embedded. In the 
absence of such a framework in emerging markets, conglomerate firms help fill this 
institutional void. To illustrate, in the absence of trained managers and training 
institutions for such managers, Business Groups would often have in-house training 
centres for the Group managers. Tata, for example, in India has a world class training 
program for all their Group managers. Similarly, in view of the many imperfections of 
developing country capital markets, it is more efficient for the Business Group central 
office to allocate capital directly through an appropriate internal allocative 
mechanism. Williamson (1975) is the classic reference on this subject. 
 
In relation to international trade, developing country corporations are at a serious 
competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis those from advanced countries. The latter have 
well-established brand names, huge advertising budgets which constitute enormous 
barriers to entry for developing country firms.  The Business Group gives these firms 
an institutional means of at least partially overcoming this handicap. Instead of 
promoting brand names for particular products as advanced countries corporations do, 
those in emerging markets attempt to build the image and reputation for high quality 
of the Business Group as a whole. Thus, the Samsung and Hyundai groups are 
promoted -  rather than single product lines - as a strategic response to the market 
disadvantages which individual or unaffiliated developing country firms face. This 
has arguably been a major factor in the success of large Korean conglomerates in the 
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 See further Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) on this point. 
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 This is Guy Pfefferman’s phrase. See Singh (1995a). 
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international market place. The result is that by 1990, 11 Korean firms were 
represented in the Fortune magazine ranking of the world’s top five hundred 
corporations, the same number as Switzerland.  Twenty years earlier, there was not a 
single Korean company in the top five hundred.
3
 
 
Amsden and Hikino (1994) put forward a different kind of argument to explain the 
existence and the efficiency of privately owned Business Groups in late industrialising 
countries. They suggest that in these countries Business Group managers become 
adept at choosing, purchasing and adapting relevant technologies from abroad. This 
kind of expertise Amsden and Hikino suggest is not industry specific and can be used 
in many different industries. Support for this hypothesis is provided by the 
Management Agency System, which prevailed in India for almost a hundred years. 
Under this system, teams specialising in modern management would offer to run firms 
on modern lines in different industries for a management fee.  The system was 
ultimately abolished in India after independence, not on grounds of inefficiency, but 
rather on grounds of equity – the system was held to promote monopoly power and 
was at variance with India’s “socialistic” pattern of development.  Many of the 
leading present day Indian Business Groups are direct descendants of the 
Management Agency System. 
 
There are thus powerful analytical arguments for the existence, survival and 
efficiency of Business groups in developing countries. In the absence of appropriate 
institution and markets which have taken a long time to develop, the dominant Anglo-
Saxon strategies of “core competence” and “focus” are unlikely to be suitable for 
Business Groups in emerging markets. 
 
Empirical evidence 
Turning now to empirical evidence, how do developing country Business Groups 
perform relative to unaffiliated firms? Are they so idiosyncratically diversified that 
despite the reasons outlined above they are nevertheless inefficient and need to be 
down-sized or abolished altogether?  Some empirical research on this issue is 
summarised in Table 11.  The table comes from Khanna and Yafeh’s (2000) careful 
and painstaking study of Business Groups from 15 emerging markets. As the 
definition of what constitutes a Business Group differs between countries in this 
research it is defined on the basis of local expert knowledge in each country.
15
  The 
table pertains to various periods in the 1980s and 1990s.  It indicates that in 9 out of 
15 emerging markets, the average rate of return of the group-affiliated firms was 
greater than that of the unaffiliated firms.  In 8 out of 15 emerging markets, the 
average standard deviation of the rate of return of the affiliated groups is smaller than 
that of their unaffiliated counterparts.  Nevertheless, only a few of the differences are 
statistically significant.  Khanna and Yafeh (2000) conclude from this evidence that 
the “provision of risk sharing, to compensate for under-developed capital markets, is 
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 See further Amsden and Hikino (1994), Singh (1995b) 
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 In some countries, Business Group’s are organised along the lines of holding companies, i.e., the 
leading company either directly or through pyramiding holds a controlling equity stake in the affiliated 
company.   In other countries, the affiliated companies are not bound by large equity stakes, but more 
by social ties, ethnic origin or firm history (such as the Japanese keiretsu).  For a fuller discussion, see 
Khanna (2000). 
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probably not the most important reason for the ubiquity of business groups around the 
world.”  
 
Khanna (2000) provides a review of the empirical studies on the efficiency of 
Business Groups.  He concludes:  
 
…the existing evidence suggests that the performance effects of group affiliation are 
large and generally positive.  There is substantial evidence that part of this is due to 
welfare-enhancing functions originating in the idea that groups substitute for missing 
outside institutions, but that part is also due to welfare-reducing minority shareholder 
exploitation.  (p.748) 
 
The last clause in Khanna’s conclusion suggests that there are also negative effects of 
Business Groups.  Specifically, the Groups are known to exploit the minority 
shareholders in the Group companies (see further Claessens et al., 1999 and Johnson 
et al., 1999).  However, notwithstanding anecdotal evidence about rent-seeking and 
monopolistic behaviour of Business Groups, there is very little systematic empirical 
evidence on this subject.   
 
Policy Issues: The Chaebol Reform in Korea 
 
The most important and immediate policy issues with respect to the Business Groups 
in emerging markets arise in relation to the chaebol conglomerates in Korea.  Chaebol 
reform constituted an important element in the IMF conditionality for Korea 
following the financial crisis on 1997-98.  Reforms involved improvements in 
corporate governance, greater focus, reducing the level of diversification and 
reductions in the debt/equity ratio.  This was envisaged to be a part of the structural 
reform of the corporate sector from close relationships between the government, 
business and the banks to an arm’s length relationship between the three entities.  
After initial hesitation, the new Kim Dae Jung government evidently supported these 
reforms (Krause, 2000).   
 
The most serious criticism of the chaebol was that they had invested recklessly in 
unprofitable projects on borrowed money.   It is indeed true that the top chaebol had, 
at the time of the crisis, high debt/equity ratios (see Table 12).  The top five chaebols 
had an average debt/equity ratio of 458% in 1997.  Under the government’s 
reorganisation plan, imposed on the chaebol, they were supposed to reduce these 
ratios to 200% by the end of 1999.   
 
It will be appreciated in the light of the theoretical and empirical discussions above 
that the case for such reforms on grounds of economic efficiency are rather thin.  As 
Khanna and Palepu (1999) note, abolishing or restricting the chaebol may be 
inefficient in the absence of a range of market institutions that will take time to 
develop.  There is also no reason to believe that the optimal debt/equity ratio for the 
top five chaebols is necessarily 200%, rather than any other arbitrary number.   Other 
countries with different financial systems than those of the U.K. and the US also have 
high debt/equity ratios, for example, Norway (500-538%), Sweden (555%) and 
Finland (492%).  In Japan the debt/equity ratio in 1991 was measured at 369%, while 
in France and Italy it measured 361% and 307% respectively.  Moreover, there is 
reason to believe that the debt/equity ratios of US corporations are rising as they are 
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buying up their own equity by borrowing money (Economist, Jan.22-Feb.2, 2001, 
Survey of Corporate Finance). 
 
However, as Singh (1998c) notes, the more significant point in relation to the high 
debt/equity ratios of Korean chaebol is that these corporate financial arrangements 
were functional within the traditional Korean system.  These arrangements were 
particularly useful during Korea’s industrialisation drive, as the corporations were 
induced by the government to enter into new technological area involving huge risks.  
Left to themselves, the corporations may not have been able to undertake such risks, 
but with the government becoming in effect a co-partner through the banking system, 
such technological risks were effectively “socialised”.  However, this system became 
dysfunctional when the government introduced financial liberalisation and abolished 
economic planning in the early 1990s in preparation for its membership in the OECD.  
By permitting Korean companies and banks to raise money abroad without the 
traditional supervision and control, the authorities were unable to control – or even 
monitor – the rapid accumulation of short-term, foreign currency denominated debt.  
In this connection, it is interesting to note the case of India, since Business Groups 
there are also highly geared.  However, despite the fact that the country’s 
fundamentals were, if anything, weaker than those in Korea, a crisis did not develop 
because the government maintained strict controls on the foreign-currency exposure 
of the private sector.  Thus, India’s limited and deliberate move towards capital 
account convertibility has lessened the vulnerability of the rupee to sudden shifts in 
investor sentiment and to speculative attacks.             
 
The empirical evidence in support of the popular view that Business Groups in 
developing countries must be drastically reformed or even abolished is strikingly thin.  
However, there remains theoretical and empirical support for the view that large 
Business Groups play a key role in late industrialisation by compensating for 
structural gaps in developing country capital, product and labour markets.  Given the 
paucity of evidence and studies in this area, it is appropriate to adopt a more cautious 
stance with regard to these groups than the current orthodox policy consensus allows.  
As Khanna (2000) notes in the conclusion to his study: “What seems clear is that an 
extreme characterization of groups as purely socially harmful or purely socially 
welfare enhancing appears unsupported by the evidence (p.756).”   
 
It is also pertinent to point out that the charge that Business Groups are large 
bureaucratic organisations that thwart innovation and small firm entry is not supported 
by analysis and evidence.  On the contrary, Khanna and Palepu (1999) note that in the 
absence of specialised venture capital firms, the Business Groups in emerging markets 
help fill this institutional gap.  Evidence from India – a successful IT country – 
suggests that the top 25 Indian exports and producers of IT were mostly off-shoots of 
big Business Groups (Singh, Singh and Weisse, 2000). 
    
Finally, in relation to corporate governance, the IMF view is to restructure the chaebol 
towards maximizing shareholder value, giving greater power to minority shareholders, 
increasing the representation of non-executive directors on the board – in other words, 
to look more like Anglo-Saxon firms.  However, Singh (1998, 1999) and Chang and 
Park (1999) have argued that this is not the most desirable reform agenda, let alone 
the only possible one.  An alternative reform strategy is proposed by Singh (1999) 
which envisages building on the close relationship between government, business and 
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finance.  It is suggested that in order to overcome the crisis, these relationships need 
to be strengthened further rather than being abandoned.  One way to do this would be 
to extend the government-business relationship to other social sectors, particularly 
labour and civil society.  Such co-operative relationships with respect to the 
governance of corporations and the society at large are more likely to help in the 
current crisis than arm’s length relationships between government, business and 
labour.  The latter types of structure have a tendency to degenerate into adversarial 
relations during times of crisis that can make the desired changes more difficult to 
achieve. 
 
VIII. Competition and Corporate Governance: Theoretical Issues 
 
Milton Friedman long ago argued that if there was perfect competition in product 
markets economists would not have had to worry about problems of separation of 
ownership and control in modern corporations or about the associated problem of 
corporate governance.  Natural selection in a competitive market would ensure that 
only the profit maximisers – and by implication, only the optimal ownership patterns 
and corporate governance structures – would survive.  However, as Winters (1964) 
subsequently showed rigorously, if competition was imperfect, different corporate 
governance systems could co-exist.   
 
The debate than moved to the capital market.  In seminal contributions Alchian and 
Kessel (1962) and Manne (1965) argued that even if there was imperfect competition 
in the product markets, firms would still be forced to maximize profit and to adopt the 
optimal governance structures.  Otherwise they would be subject to takeover from 
those who would be willing to maximise monopoly profits.  The validity of this 
assertion depends on the existence of a perfect capital market including a market for 
corporate control.  In the event, although there have been huge merger waves during 
the last century or more (specifically during the 1960s, 1980s and 1990s) in the 
Anglo-Saxon economies, these have not fulfilled the requirement of a perfect market 
for corporate control.  As noted earlier in Section VI, this market suffers from 
fundamental imperfections: it is much easier for a large and profitable firm to take 
over a small profitable firm than the other way around.  This hypothesis is confirmed 
by empirical evidence which suggests that. in the real world, the probability of 
survival for a large unprofitable firm are significantly higher than those for a smaller, 
relatively profitable firm. 
   
In the light of these difficulties with the market for corporate control, the wheel has 
turned full circle.  It is now being suggested that the main constraint on the behaviour 
and governance structure of the large corporations is the intense international 
competition in product markets.  Nevertheless, neoclassical economists now recognise 
that in view of the oligopolistic nature of product market competition and 
imperfections in the market for corporate control, there does exist a governance 
problem in the modern corporation: this is modelled in the form of a principal-agent 
problem (Jensen and Meckeling, 1979; Jensen, 1988).  In this conception, the 
separation of ownership and control imposes agency costs on the corporation.  The 
magnitude of this cost varies inversely with the nature and extent of the competition 
in the product and capital markets.  As the relevant aspects of the market for corporate 
control has already been examined, above and in Section VI, we turn now to a 
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discussion of the nature and extent of competition including international competition 
in emerging markets.  
 
IX.  Product market competition in emerging markets 
Apart from its significance for the study of corporate governance, it is also important 
to examine the product market competition in emerging markets for other more 
practical reasons. These relate to new developments during the last two decades in the 
international economy as well as those in the domestic economies of developing 
countries.  The implications of these developments for the competitive behaviour of 
firms and for the intensity of competition in emerging markets will be discussed in 
this sector whilst those for competition policy will be taken up in the next discussion. 
 
1. Initiated by former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the U.K. during the 
1980s, there has been a worldwide trend toward privatisation of state industry and 
deregulation.  These privatised firms in many of the emerging markets often 
involve natural monopolies.  It is therefore important to find out how competition 
and competitive behaviour has changed as a result of privatisation of former state 
owned monopolies and other publicly owned enterprises.  
 
2. The international economy under globalisation and liberalisation has been subject 
to a gigantic international merger wave during the last decade.  There have been 
large merger waves before in advanced countries which have occurred 
simultaneously in several countries (e.g., the merger wave of the late 1960s) but 
these have generally not involved any significant amount of cross-border 
takeovers.  However, the current merger wave in the US and U.K. (the two 
countries with the best historical statistics on this subject) is not only likely to be 
the largest ever recorded in terms of the total value of the corporations' GDP, but 
it will also have, for the first time, a large cross-border component.  
 
The cross-border M&A activity has mainly involved corporations in advanced 
countries.  Nevertheless, there has been considerable M&A activity in emerging 
markets as well (see Tables 13a and 13b).  The activities have mostly involved foreign 
multinationals (the domestic market for corporate control in emerging markets is 
typically very small, if not non-existent).  These takeovers by foreign multinationals 
in emerging markets have direct implications for competitive behaviour of firms and 
hence for competition policy.  As noted earlier, even the merger activity in advanced 
countries has potential consequences for competition and competition policy in 
emerging markets. 
 
Notwithstanding the significance of the subject, there is very little systematic 
information available on the intensity of competition in emerging markets on an 
international comparative basis.  There is anecdotal evidence and conjectures about 
the degree of competition in these countries.  For example, as stated earlier, the IMF 
analysis of the structural reasons for the financial crisis in East Asia in 1997-98 
suggests that the deeper reasons for the crisis lay, in part, in the poor competitive 
environment in countries such as Korea leading to over-investment.  On the other 
hand, Porter (1992) and Amsden and Singh (1994) suggest that Korean chaebol 
display vigorous rivalry in both national and international markets.  However, some 
support for the IMF position is provided by Table 14 which gives average 
concentration ratios for different time periods for a small group of emerging markets.  
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The Table suggests that concentration tend to be high in these countries, being 
sometimes greater than those in advanced countries.  However, economists have long 
recognised that such concentration measures based only on properties of the size 
distribution of firms are inadequate for measuring the intensity of competition in an 
economy. 
 
Recently, however, Glen, Lee and Singh (2000) have addressed the question of 
intensity of competition in emerging markets directly and provided systematic 
comparative evidence on how this varies between emerging markets and also between 
developed and developing countries.  The authors use standard methodology based on 
the so-called “persistence of profitability” studies to measure intensity of competition.  
This methodology has been employed in a large number of studies to analyse the 
intensity of competition in advanced country product markets.
16
 The basic intuition 
here is that if competition was intense, firms would tend to display low persistence of 
profits as any temporary advantage which a firm may enjoy (either say because of 
good management, a new money making technique or monopoly power) will soon be 
competed away by rivals.  On the other hand, if the competition is not so intense then 
those with above average profits in one period will continue to have above average 
profits in subsequent periods. 
 
Glen, Lee and Singh have carried out a time series analysis of profitability for 350 
emerging market corporations in seven countries.  Their estimated persistency 
coefficients are reported in Table 15.  The corresponding coefficients for advanced 
countries which are based on the same methodology are reported in Table 16.  A 
comparison of the two tables reveals that, remarkably, the persistency coefficients in 
emerging markets are systematically lower than those for advanced countries. This 
result is quite unexpected as many economists would assume a priori that emerging 
markets will have less intense market competition than advanced countries.  Laffont 
(1999), for example, argues that developing country markets are likely to be highly 
imperfect because of their small size, lack of transportation and other infrastructural 
deficits. 
 
Glen, Lee and Singh argue that their results may be counterintuitive but they are not 
implausible.  Economists have similar preconceptions about competition in Japan 
which was thought to be less intense than in US manufacturing industry.  However, 
systematic empirical research indicated that, in fact, this was not the case, it is true 
that US retailing is more efficient that Japanese retailing but wholesale manufacturing 
goods markets, if anything, display greater intensity of competition in Japan than in 
the US.  More importantly, Glen, Lee and Singh’s conclusion on the intensity of 
competition in emerging markets is fully in accord with evidence presented in a 
comprehensive review article on the efficiency of third world manufacturing industry 
by Tybout (2000).  He observes: 
 The manufacturing sectors of developing countries have traditionally 
been relatively protected.  They have also been subject to heavy 
regulation, much of which is biased in favour of large enterprises.  
Accordingly, it if often argued that manufacturers in these countries 
perform poorly in several respects: (1) firm productivity dispersion 
is high; (2) small groups of entrenched oligopolists exploit 
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 The classic reference here are Mueller 1986 and 1990, the latter is a collection of studies for a large 
number of advanced economies.  See also Waring (1996), Goddard and Wilson (1999). 
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monopoly power in product markets; and (3) many small firms are 
unable or unwilling to grow, so important scale economies go 
unexploited. 
  
It is important to emphasise that the above remarks about the unexpectedly high 
intensity of competition in emerging markets apply only to manufacturing industry. 
Sectors such as banking and retailing are much less efficient in emerging than in 
advanced country markets. 
Tybout concludes: 
 
 Indeed, although the issue remains open, the existing empirical 
literature does not support the notion that LDC manufacturers are 
relatively stagnant and inefficient.  Turnover rates in plants and jobs 
are at least as high as those found in the OECD and the amount if 
cross-plant dispersion in measured productivity rates is not generally 
greater.  Also, although small-scale production is relatively common 
in LDCs, there do not appear to be major potential gains from better 
exploitation of scale economies.  
 
X. Developing countries, WTO and competition policy  
Apart from their effects on the intensity of competition in emerging markets, the new 
national and international developments detailed in the previous section also have 
important implications for competition policy.  For even though we have found that 
product market competition is no less intense in developing than in developed 
countries, this does not obviate the need for a competition policy.  The latter is 
required in developing countries today not least to counter the potential anti-
competitive impact of mergers and acquisitions by large multinationals both within 
developing countries as well as worldwide. 
 
Many developing countries do not have a competition policy and so far have not 
needed one.  This was mainly because of state control of economic activities and 
regulation of various markets.  Competition policy was not required because many 
governments had the powers to use direct price controls to restrain monopoly power if 
necessary.  But now, with extensive privatisation, a much diminished state sector and 
deregulation, it is clearly necessary for developing countries to have some polices to 
regulate anti-competitive behaviour.  The main question is what kind of competition 
policy is appropriate for these countries?  Should they adopt the same kind of 
competition laws as those implemented in the US or the U.K.?  Or should competition 
policy of developing countries be different from those of advanced countries? 
 
At the WTO advanced countries have been pressing developing countries to include 
competition policy in the WTO agreements in order to ensure ‘fair play’ and ‘level 
playing fields’ between countries.  The argument is simple: if one country (say) 
allows mergers freely while another has a competition policy prohibiting monopoly 
creating mergers, there would not be ‘fair’ competition between firms in the two 
countries.  This will lead not only to a global misallocation of resources but may also 
not generate fair competition between firms in the two countries.
17
Most advanced 
countries have a competition policy of one kind or another and in their case it is a 
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not always observed even in advanced countries. 
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matter of harmonising  such policies so that free trade and free capital flows between 
countries are unimpeded.   
 
Developing countries have been opposed to the proposal that competition policy 
should become a part of the WTO disciplines.  Their formal stance has been to 
suggest that a large number of them do not yet have a competition policy whereas 
advanced countries have experience with such policy, some of them for the last 100 
years. Therefore, they cannot be expected to enter into negotiations about a subject 
they don’t know anything about. The real reason for developing country opposition is 
that they do not wish any new disciplines to be included in the WTO agreements 
because of the provision of cross-sanctions: a violation in one area may be penalised 
in an another by the complaining country (if the complaint is held to be justified).  
Developing countries take the view that the Uruguay Round Agreements, that 
established the WTO, need to be reviewed for their impact on developing countries 
before undertaking a new round of tariff cutting or starting negotiations on new 
subjects such as competition policy and the multi-lateral agreement on investment 
(MAI).
 
 
 
As the subject of MAI has been examined elsewhere,
18
 we confine ourselves in this 
paper to the question of competition policy.  At the Singapore ministerial meeting of 
the WTO in 1996 a compromise was struck whereby it was agreed that competition 
policy would be examined by a study group without prejudice to any future 
negotiations.  It was also accepted in the ministerial declaration that the study group 
would give particular attention to the development dimension of competition policy.  
Accordingly, a study group was duly established at the WTO to examine the matter 
and its term was extended at the Seattle meeting in 1999. 
 
Notwithstanding the justified misgivings of developing countries with respect to any 
negotiations on the subject at the WTO, it is important for them to acquire an 
understanding of the important issues involved in this area and be prepared to offer 
counter proposals when appropriate. 
 
The question of competition policy in developing countries is being studied not only 
at the WTO but also by a number of other organisations, including UNCTAD, the 
World Bank and the Commonwealth Secretariat.  Consequently, there is large and 
growing literature on the subject but, with a few exceptions, much of it is 
unsatisfactory as it does not take into account the development dimension (despite 
claims to the contrary).  
 
Singh and Dhumale (1999) provide a trenchant critique of the documents generated 
by the WTO study group in relation to the development dimension. They argue that in 
order to give adequate recognition to this aspect of competition policy, it is not 
enough to give developing countries more time to adjust. Rather, new concepts and 
definitions are needed.  The WTO concepts of market access, reciprocity, national 
treatment are shown to be unsuitable for examining the implications of competition 
policy for economic development.  Specifically, the authors note that the main 
objective of competition policy in advanced country such as the US is promotion of 
consumer welfare.  For developing countries, a more appropriate objective would 
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instead be to achieve sustained and substantial increases in the trend rate of growth of 
productivity.  Such an objective was pursued in Japan in 1950-73.  That country, at 
the start of the period, had a level of per capita income similar to that of many 
developing countries today but attained exceptionally high growth in the subsequent 
two decades.  The Japanese experience of this earlier post-world war II era with 
respect to competition and industrial policy is particularly useful for developing 
countries. 
 
Promotion of high rates of growth of productivity necessitates high rates of 
investment which, in turn, in a mixed economy, requires maintaining the private 
sector’s propensity to invest.  Singh and Dhumale show that this needs an optimal 
degree of competition rather than maximum competition.  They emphasise, in case of 
developing countries, that keeping the private sector’s propensity to invest at high 
levels requires a steady growth of profits.  This would necessitate government co-
ordination of investment decisions to prevent over-capacity and falling profits.  The 
authors therefore outline the concept of an optimal combination of competition and 
co-operation to achieve fast long-term growth. They also introduced the concept of 
simulated competition, i.e. contests for state support which can be as powerful as real 
market competition. 
 
Singh and Dhumale add that these concepts are new only in relation to the current 
discourse at the WTO and at other international organisation on the subject. The 
concepts are derived from modern economic theory and have been tested by empirical 
evidence.  Interestingly, some of the concepts have been used in the WTO 
Agreements themselves, but usually to benefit rich rather than poor countries . For 
example the TRIPS Agreement allows temporary restraint on free competition in 
order to promote technical progress.  However, the extra patent protection provided 
under the WTO Agreements benefits mainly rich countries who hold or produce most 
of the world’s patents. At one level, all that Singh and Dhumale do is to apply such 
concepts to the advantage of developing countries in order to promote their economic 
development. 
 
To sum up, there are two important implications following from the above analysis 
which deserve emphasis.  Firstly, developing countries do need a competition policy 
but that policy needs to be specific to the relevant stage of a country’s development. 
Secondly there is a need for special and differential treatment of developing countries 
in relation to competition policy.  This is required in order to truly ‘level the playing 
field’ in an operational sense.  Even large developing country firms tend to be both 
relatively small and also handicapped by the many deficits that arise from economic 
underdevelopment as compared to the large multi-national firms from advanced 
countries.  In these circumstances, instead of ‘national treatment’ of foreign multi-
national firms, a developing country competition authority may prohibit takeovers by 
such companies operating in the country and yet allow domestic firms to amalgamate 
in order to compete better against the larger multinationals.  In this instance, non-
national treatment may serve both competition and economic development. 
 
However, even the development friendly competition policy sketched out above may 
not be adequate to cope with the potential anti-competitive effects of the current 
international merger wave.  For this, ideally, an international competition authority is 
required to be able to prevent abuse of dominant position by large multinational firms 
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and other anti-competition behaviour.  The need for such an authority arises from the 
fact that even an advanced country like the US, with all its paraphernalia of 
competition laws and its extra-territoriality, is unable to prevent price fixing by 
international cartels.  Not to long ago, a European cartel of vitamin producers was 
fined three quarters of a billion dollars for illegally fixing (high) prices.  If this can 
happen to the US, there would be little to prevent cartelisation by subsidiaries of 
multi-national companies in developing countries and for them to engage in similar 
activities.  In the absence of an international competition authority, which the 
advanced countries are not as yet prepared to accept, developing countries would be 
better off in dealing with anti-competitive behaviour of large multinationals 
collectively, through regional organisations, rather than on an individual basis.
19
 
 
XI. Summary and Conclusions 
This study has examined analytical, empirical and policy issues of particular interest 
to developing countries in two areas: corporate governance and competition policy.  
These subjects are not currently at the top of the agenda for most of these countries.  
Nevertheless, these matters are being considered by several international bodies 
including the WTO, the World Bank and the OECD in the context of the proposals for 
the New International Financial Architecture and the new liberalized trading system.  
These international organizations do not, however, always act in the interest of 
developing countries.  The latter therefore need independent analyses of these issues 
so as to be able to properly assess the proposed reforms from their own perspective 
and, when necessary, offer alternative proposals.  The main purpose of this paper has 
been to provide such an independent assessment and to raise the consciousness of 
developing countries about these issues. 
 
The principal conclusions on corporate governance may be summarised as follows: 
 
1. The main premise of the IMF and leading U.S. officials that the deeper causes 
of the Asian crisis were the flawed systems of corporate governance and a 
poor competitive environment in the affected countries is not supported by the 
evidence.  The available facts are much more in accord with the alternative 
thesis that the fundamental reason for the crisis was the precipitate capital 
account liberalization that a number of these countries had carried out in the 
period preceding the crisis. 
 
2. Despite claims to the contrary, the system of corporate governance favoured 
by the OECD and World Bank is the arm’s-length model found in the United 
States and the United Kingdom.  The codes of best practice and the self-
assessment exercises reflect this preference and it is thus likely to form the 
basis of these organisations’ advice to developing countries, especially when 
conditionality is imposed in times of crisis. 
 
3. The arm’s length model of the relationship between business, banks and the  
government, as found in its ideal form in the U.S. and the U.K., is deeply 
                                                          
19
  An early international 'initiative' in this area was the discussion of  restrictive business practices by 
large multinationals at UNCTAD II in New Delhi in 1968, and at UNCTAD IV in Nairobi in 1976. The 
UN General Assembly in December 1980 adopted by Resolution 35/63, a "set of Multi-laterally 
Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for theControl ofRestrictive Business Practices".  However, this 
is not a legally binding document and has not bee helpful to developing countries (see Correa, 1999). 
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embedded in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence and corporate law. It is particularly 
suitable for the Berle and Means corporate law pattern of dispersed share 
ownership typically observed in large corporations in these countries.  
The Berle and Means corporation has specific governance problems, deriving 
from the separation of ownership and control. These lead to the well-known  
problematique of the principal-agent relationships between shareholders and 
managers, involving concepts of agency costs, asymmetric information and 
incomplete contracting.  
 
However, the Berle and Means pattern of ownership is by far the exception in 
developing countries and in much of continental Europe.  In these countries, 
the most prevalent form of ownership is family control.  The corporate 
governance issues for large firms in these countries are, therefore, quite 
different from those of Anglo-Saxon economies.  The family-based systems of 
corporate governance are often associated with relationship banking.  A priori, 
there is no reason to believe that such systems are necessarily inferior to the 
arm’s length stock-market based Anglo-Saxon model.  Both have positive and 
negative features.  To the extent that the former systems are better able to 
resolve the agency problems, suffer much less from the short-termism and 
speculative bubbles of the stock market based model, they are arguably more 
conducive to long-term economic development of emerging countries. 
Empirical evidence suggests that emerging markets, as well as European 
countries such as Italy, Sweden or Germany have successful records of fast 
long-term growth with these systems, indeed superior to those of Anglo-Saxon 
countries. 
 
4. However, in the wake of the Asian financial crises, family-based corporate 
control systems have been associated with crony capitalism, measured in one 
important sense in terms of control of a large proportion of national wealth by 
a small number of corporate families.  Whether such crony capitalism leads to 
moral hazards and economic instability, or instead helps resolve co-ordination 
problems ubiquitous in a market economy, is pre-eminently an empirical 
question.  Empirical evidence presented in this paper indicates that there is no 
relationship between crony capitalism and the Asian economic crisis. 
Countries with and without a high incidence of crony capitalism experienced 
the crisis.  Similarly, there are examples of both kinds of countries which 
escaped the crisis. 
 
5. The theoretical foundations of the OECD/World Bank proposals can be found 
in the contributions of LLSV.  The basic proposition of the LLSV approach is 
that the legal protection afforded to investors (primarily minority shareholders) 
determines the availability of external finance.  If minority shareholders are 
protected, external finance will become more prevalent which will have 
beneficial effects of investment and, ultimately, growth.  The LLSV studies are 
an important contribution to our knowledge of legal systems and corporate 
governance structures and their relation to financing and growth.  However, it 
is argued in this study that LLSV’s conclusions are overstated.  In particular, it 
is argued that the approach is far too narrow to adequately capture the changes 
taking place in corporate finance in developing countries and, furthermore, that 
legal structure and corporate finance jointly interact and the direction of 
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causality is not simply from the former to the latter.  The LLSV approach also 
elevates shareholders and creditors above other stakeholders in the firm and 
relegates other important relationships (such as the relationships between 
workers and management and suppliers and the firm) to secondary status.   
 
6. Corporate finance patterns in developing countries in the 1990s were broadly 
similar to those in the 1980s in a number of important aspects.  Large 
developing countries firms continued to rely overwhelmingly on external 
sources to finance their growth of total assets.  Contrary to the “pecking order” 
theory, large firms in many developing countries financed more of their growth 
through issuance of equity on stock markets than through retained profits.  
Stock markets have thus helped large firms to raise considerable amounts of 
external finance, but whether this has led to higher national saving rates is 
unclear. The effects of stock market development on corporate governance and 
development depends on two market processes: (a) the nature and efficiency of 
the takeover mechanism and (b) that of the pricing process.  This paper has 
argued that there is a wealth of evidence that the latter is often dominated by 
speculation, herding and fads that undermine its capacity to efficiently direct 
the allocation of resources.  It has also been suggested that the takeover 
mechanism is inherently flawed and an expensive method of changing 
corporate governance.  Furthermore, it was pointed out that the inadequacies 
and perverse incentives in both the pricing process and the takeover mechanism 
are likely to be exacerbated in developing countries. 
 
7. In the wake of the Asian crisis, it has been argued that developing country 
conglomerates are inefficient, financially precarious and, because they are “too 
big to fail”, create moral hazard.  The analysis of this paper indicates that 
conglomerates are in fact an efficient response to inadequacies in developing 
country labour, capital and product markets.  Far from being inefficient, 
conglomerates have been instrumental in overcoming market imperfections and 
promoting industrialization.  The high leverage of developing country 
conglomerates was shown to be not out of line with that of many firms in 
advanced markets, and, given the ambiguities of what constitutes the “optimal” 
debt/equity ratio it is difficult to say that they are necessarily too high.  The 
conglomerates’ difficulties with debt during the Asian crisis arose from their 
unmonitored and uncontrolled exposure to short-term external credit rather 
than from their high debt-equity ratios per se.  These elements – government 
monitoring and control of capital movements – which were central to the 
traditional state guided economic systems in these countries had been 
abandoned and, as noted earlier, replaced by capital account liberalisation in 
the period immediately preceding the crises 
 
8. Apart from poor corporate governance, it was argued that inadequate 
competition between large firms in developing country markets was a 
contributing “deep” reason for the Asian crisis.  However, empirical evidence 
examined in this paper suggests that this preconception is also greatly at 
variance with facts.  A comparative analysis of the relative persistence of 
corporate rates of return in emerging markets and in advanced economies 
indicates that the former displayed lower profits persistency than the latter.  
This suggests that product market competition is no less intense in emerging 
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markets than in advanced economies, subjecting developing country managers 
to market discipline.   
 
9. This paper suggests that despite this competitive environment, developing 
countries must develop effective competition policies because of (a) extensive 
privatisation of state-owned enterprises including natural monopolies; and (b) 
the current huge international merger wave.  The latter imposes important new 
challenges to developing countries both to protect themselves from the 
potentially anti-competitive behaviour of mammoth multinationals as well as to 
provide space for their own national firms to grow.  In the face of mergers 
between huge multinationals, even developed countries have had to enforce 
competition policies more diligently.  The merger between McDonnell-
Douglas and Boeing compelled the European Union competition authorities to 
intervene, while the cornering of the US vitamin market by a European cartel 
obliged US authorities to enforce competition by imposing the largest-ever 
anti-trust fine of three-quarters of a billion dollars on cartel members.  Given 
that large developed economies can be subject to such actual or potential anti-
competitive behaviour, smaller and more open developing countries are far 
more vulnerable. 
   
10. However, contrary to the approach being advanced by the WTO that would 
allow no special or differential treatment of developing countries, this paper 
argues that from the perspective of economic development, these countries 
must be allowed to tailor their competition policy to suit their specific 
circumstances.  In particular, they should not be compelled to extend national 
treatment to multinational enterprises since the presence of these huge concerns 
in developing countries may reduce competition by driving smaller national 
competitors from the market.  The US model of competition policy stresses 
maximum competition, whereas the optimal policy for developing countries 
must contain a more subtle blend of competition and cooperation.   
In sum, this paper has argued that there is a diversity of corporate governance systems 
that have proved effective in different national contexts.  The continental Europeans 
and the Japanese have prospered with alternative corporate governance systems that 
have given a larger voice to stakeholders in the firm and have afforded relatively less 
protection to outside investors.   The system of corporate governance in the US and 
the U.K. is clearly not the only way to effectively and efficiently run the corporate 
economy and, indeed, for developing countries it is far from being the best way.  Its 
reliance on the stock market and consequently on that market’s pricing process and 
takeover mechanism creates perverse incentives that can undermine long-term growth 
by accentuating the influence of short-term considerations.   
 
In place of a drive by international organizations to promote the Anglo-Saxon system 
of corporate governance around the world, what is needed is a genuine recognition 
that there are many competing systems of corporate governance and it must be left to 
developing countries to decide which one is optimal for their particular circumstances.  
Above all, what is required is an analysis of corporate governance structures 
underpinned by a solid factual understanding of these systems in economic 
development.  It must be free of the ideology and prejudice that reflexively argues that 
conglomerates are bad, that competition in developing markets is inadequate and that 
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any corporate governance system other than the Anglo-Saxon model is intrinsically 
flawed. 
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Table 1. Control of publicly traded firms around the world, 1996 (per cent) 
      
Economy Widely 
held 
Family 
owned 
State 
owned 
Widely held 
financial 
Widely held 
corporation 
      
OECD countries       
(non-Bank borrower)      
      
Australia 65 5 5  25 
Austria 5 15 70   
Belguim 5 50 5 30  
Canada 60 25   15 
Denmark 40 35 15   
Finland 35 10 35 5 5 
France 60 20 15 5  
Germany 50 10 25 15  
Greece 10 50 30 10  
Ireland 65 10   10 
Italy 20 15 40 5 10 
Japan 90 5 5   
Netherlands 30 20 5  10 
New Zealand 30 25 25  20 
Norway 25 25 35 5  
Portugal 10 45 25 15 0 
Spain 35 15 30 10 10 
Sweden 25 45 10 15  
Switzerland 60 3  5  
UK 100     
USA 80 20    
      
Bank borrowers and others     
      
Argentina  65 15 5 15 
Hong Kong 10 70 5 5  
Israel 5 50 40  5 
Mexico  100    
Singapore 15 30 45 5 5 
Korea, Rep. of 55 20 15  5 
      
      
Source: Iskander and Chamlou     
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Table2.  Control of publicly traded companies in East Asia
Country Number of 
corporations
Widely held Family State Widely held 
financial
Widely held 
corporation
10% cutoff
Hong Kong 330 0.6 64.7 3.7 7.1 23.9
Indonesia 178 0.6 68.6 10.2 3.8 16.8
Japan 1240 42.0 13.1 1.1 38.5 5.3
Korea 345 14.3 67.9 5.1 3.5 9.2
Malaysia 238 1.0 57.5 18.2 12.1 11.2
Philippines 120 1.7 42.1 3.6 16.8 35.9
Singapore 221 1.4 52.0 23.6 10.8 12.2
Taiwan 141 2.9 65.6 3.0 10.4 18.1
Thailand 167 2.2 56.5 7.5 12.8 21.1
20% cutoff
Hong Kong 330 7.0 66.7 1.4 5.2 19.8
Indonesia 178 5.1 71.5 8.2 2.0 13.2
Japan 1240 79.8 9.7 0.8 6.5 3.2
Korea 345 43.2 48.4 1.6 0.7 6.1
Malaysia 238 10.3 67.2 13.4 2.3 6.7
Philippines 120 19.2 44.6 2.1 7.5 26.7
Singapore 221 5.4 55.4 23.5 4.1 11.5
Taiwan 141 26.2 48.2 2.8 5.3 17.4
Thailand 167 6.6 61.6 8.0 8.6 15.3
Note: Newly assembled data for 2,980 publicly traded corporations (including both financial and 
non-financial institutions) as based on Worldscope and supplemented with information from
country-specific sources.  In all cases, Claessens et al. collected the ownership structure as of the 
end of fiscal year 1996 or the closest possible date.
Source: Claessens et al. (2000), p.103.
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Table 3: Proportion of ownership in India (44 companies)
Quartile Foreign Government Corporate Directors Public Total
Quartile 1 16.1 28.9 23.1 1.1 30.8 100
Quartile 2 24.3 25.6 25.6 1.2 23.3 100
Quartile 3 20.7 23.9 17.9 0.7 36.8 100
Quartile 4 22.9 33 19.2 1 23.8 100
Total 19 27.9 22.4 1.1 29.6 100
Source:
Note:
1.  Foreign refers to foreign collaborators, foreign institutional investors, foreign OCBs, foreign others and 
     NRIs.
2.  Government refers to all public financial institutions, including central and state banks.
3.  Corporate refers to promoters, subsidary companies and holding companies.
4.  Directors refers to directors and relatives.
5. Public refers to general public companies.
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Table 4.  The separation of ownership and control across type of the largest
controlling shareholder and company size
Country Category Family State Widely held 
financial
Widely held 
corporation
Hong Kong All firms 0.826 1.000 0.876 0.993
Largest 20 0.832 1.000 0.656 n.a.
Middle 50 0.886 1.000 1.000 1.000
Smallest 50 0.805 1.000 1.000 0.988
Indonesia All firms 0.687 1.000 1.000 0.949
Largest 20 0.741 1.000 n.a. 1.000
Middle 50 0.677 1.000 1.000 0.927
Smallest 50 0.702 n.a. n.a. 1.000
Japan All firms 0.984 1.000 0.495 0.943
Largest 20 1.000 1.000 n.a. n.a.
Middle 50 1.000 1.000 0.512 0.956
Smallest 50 0.983 n.a. 0.446 0.867
Korea All firms 0.833 1.000 1.000 0.986
Largest 20 0.619 1.000 n.a. n.a.
Middle 50 0.807 1.000 1.000 1.000
Smallest 50 0.861 n.a. n.a. 1.000
Malaysia All firms 0.785 0.959 1.000 0.895
Largest 20 0.942 0.871 n.a. 1.000
Middle 50 0.787 1.000 1.000 0.752
Smallest 50 0.795 0.692 1.000 0.789
Philippines All firms 0.819 0.914 0.965 0.956
Largest 20 0.878 1.000 n.a. 1.000
Middle 50 0.837 1.000 0.932 0.938
Smallest 50 0.775 0.742 0.909 0.975
Singapore All firms 0.722 0.685 0.956 0.944
Largest 20 0.604 0.794 n.a. n.a.
Middle 50 0.693 0.659 1.000 1.000
Smallest 50 0.768 0.655 1.000 0.907
Taiwan All firms 0.757 1.000 0.989 0.922
Largest 20 0.643 1.000 1.000 1.000
Middle 50 0.704 1.000 1.000 0.904
Smallest 50 0.763 n.a. 0.969 0.894
Thailand All firms 0.920 1.000 1.000 1.000
Largest 20 0.969 1.000 n.a. n.a.
Middle 50 0.935 1.000 1.000 1.000
Smallest 50 0.859 1.000 1.000 1.000
Note:  Newly assembled data for publicly traded corporations (including both financial and non-financial
institutions) as collected from Worldscope and supplemented with information from country-specific
sources.  In all cases, we collect the ownership structure as of the end of fiscal year 1996 or the 
closest possible date.  Controlling shareholders are defined at the 20% (benchmark) cutoff.  Size is 
as the largest 20 firms, the median 50 firms, and the smallest 50 firms in terms of market capitalization.
Widely held firms are excluded from the sample.  The reported numbers represent the mean ratio of
cash-flow over control rights.  When no firms fit the category, it is marked "n.a.".
Source: Claessens et al. (2000), p.102.
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Table 5.  How concentrated is family control?
Country Average number   % of total value of listed corporate assets % of GDP
of firms per family            that families control (1996) 1996
Top 1 Top 5 Top 10 Top 15 Top 15
family families families families families
Hong Kong 2.36 6.5 26.2 32.2 34.4 84.2
Indonesia 4.09 16.6 40.7 57.7 61.7 21.5
Japan 1.04 0.5 1.8 2.4 2.8 2.1
Korea 2.07 11.4 29.7 36.8 38.4 12.9
Malaysia 1.97 7.4 17.3 24.8 28.3 76.2
Philippines 2.68 17.1 42.8 52.5 55.1 46.7
Singapore 1.26 6.4 19.5 26.6 29.9 48.3
Taiwan 1.17 4.0 14.5 18.4 20.1 17.0
Thailand 1.68 9.4 32.2 46.2 53.3 39.3
Note: Newly asembled data for 2,980 publicly traded corporations (including both financial and non-financial
institutions).  The data was collected from Worldscope and supplemented with information from country-specific
sources.  In all cases, we collect the ownership structure as of the end of fiscal year 1996 or the closest possible 
date.  The "average number of firms per family" refers only to firms in the sample.  To avoid discrepancies in the cross-
country comparison due to different sample coverage, we have scaled down the control holdings of each family group
in the last four columns by assuming that the firms missing from our sample are not controlled by any of the largest
15 families.  The percent of total GDP is calculated using market capiotalization and GDP data from the World Bank.
Source: Claessens et al. (2000), p.108.
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Table 6. Legal origin and investors rights
Legal origin
Variables
Common law (18 
countries)
French civil law (21 
countries)
German civil law                    
(6 countries)
Scandinavian civil 
law            (4 
countries)
World average (49 
countries)
Panel A: Measures of shreholder protection
Antidirector rights index 4.00 2.33 2.33 3.00 3.00
Proxy by mail 39% 5% 0% 25% 18%
Shares not blocked before meeting 100% 57% 17% 100% 71%
Cumulative voting/proportional rep. 28% 29% 33% 0% 27%
Oppressed minority 94% 29% 50% 0% 53%
Preemptive right to new issues 44% 62% 33% 75% 53%
% share of capital to call and ESM<10 94% 52% 0% 0% 78%
Panel B: Measures of creditor protection
Creditor rights index 3.11 1.58 2.33 2.00 2.30
No automatic stay on secured assets 72% 26% 67% 25% 49%
Secured creditors first 89% 65% 100% 100% 81%
Paid restrictions for going into reorganization 72% 42% 33% 75% 55%
Management does not stay in reorganization 78% 26% 33% 0% 45%
Panel C: Measures of enforcement
Efficiency of the judicial system 8.15 6.56 8.54 10.00 7.67
Corruption 7.06 5.84 8.03 10.00 6.90
Accounting standards 69.92 51.17 62.67 74.00 60.93
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Table 7. The financing of corporate growth in ten emerging markets during the  
1980s 
Country Internal finance External finance 
(equity) 
External finance LTD 
Brazil 56.4 36.0 7.7 
India 40.5 19.6 39.9 
Jordan 66.3 22.1 11.6 
Malaysia 35.6 46.6 17.8 
Mexico 24.4 66.6 9.0 
Pakistan 74.0 1.7 24.3 
Republic of Korea 19.5 49.6 30.9 
Thailand  27.7 NA NA 
Turkey 15.3 65.1 19.6 
Zimbabwe 58.0 38.8 3.2 
All 38.8 39.3 20.8 
F
1
 20.0* 31.4* 21.2* 
F
2
 16.69* 18.93* 6.38* 
 
Note:  
1. F-statistic for comparison of means across countries. ‘*’ implies rejection of the null 
hypothesis of the equality of means 
2. Bartlett-Box F-statistic for variance across countries. ‘*’ implies rejection of the null 
hypothesis of equality of variance. 
 
Source: Singh 1995. 
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Table 8:  Balance sample:  Sources of financing of growth of total assets, 1992-1996 
Unweighted averages are the average of the sum (over companies) of each source of finance in each year divided 
by the sum of the growth of total assets.  The balanced samples for the four countries are as follows:  India = 115; 
Malaysia = 130; Thailand = 98; Korea = 95. 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
    India  Malaysia  Thailand  Korea* 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Retentions   23.1  25.3  13.3   5.7 
External finance    76.9  74.7  86.7  94.3 
Shares    31.2  14.6   9.6  16.1 
Debt finance   43.3  51.0  70.8  80.6 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
*Unweighted ratios for Korea are calculated over three years 1994-1996.  Some unusually large ratios for 1993 
were omitted from overall average.  Source:  WorldScope database.
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 49 India (%) Malaysia (%) Thailand (%) Korea (%)
Net asset growth 37.2 32.9 39.7 20.6
Retentions 36.9 56.9 48.0 13.7
External finance 64.9 46.8 55.6 96.5
Long term debt 40.6 14.4 36.1 67.8
Shares 24.0 18.2 15.9 21.1
Other 0.3 14.2 3.6 7.6
Statistical adjustment -1.9 -3.8 -3.5 -10.2
finance were constrained to those between -100 per cent and +200 per cent (see Singh 1995, TP2).  Internal
and external finance were calculated as in Singh (1995), TP2, page 39.  Note also that external finance of net
assets by equity (new shares) was calculated directly as against the residual used in TP2.  
The statistical adjustments in the table arise from the constraints placed on the financial ratios.
India (%) Malaysia (%) Thailand (%) Korea (%)
Retentions 36.9 56.9 48.0 13.7
External finance 63.1 43.1 52.0 86.3
Long term debt 40.6 14.4 36.1 67.8
Shares 22.5 28.6 15.9 18.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note:  This table was constructed using Singh (1995), TP2 residual method. Retentions and long-term debt were
 calculated directly and new shares werethe residual sources of funds.  Source:  Worldscope database.
Table 9b: Balanced sample: Unweighted average sources of financing of growth of net assets: 1992-1996
The balance samples for the four countries are: India = 115, Malaysia = 130, Thailand = 98, Korea = 95
Table 9a: Balanced sample: Unweighted average sources of financing of growth of net assets: 1992-1996
The balance samples for the four countries are: India = 115, Malaysia = 130, Thailand = 98, Korea = 95
Note: All cases where average annual rates of growth of net assets was less than one percent were rejected 
since low values of growth (the denominator) would lead to high values for the whole ratio.  Internal and external
 50 
Table 10.  Capital Structure of Firms in Selected Countries, 1980-1991
Debt Ratio Long-term debt to 
total equity
Short-term debt 
to total equity
Developing Countries
Brazil 0.560 0.139 0.421
India 2.700 0.763 1.937
Korea 3.662 1.057 2.390
Malaysia 0.935 0.284 0.639
Mexico 0.817 0.375 0.442
Thailand 2.215 0.518 1.769
Developed Countries
France 3.613 1.417 2.108
Germany 2.732 1.479 1.188
Italy 3.068 1.114 1.954
Japan 3.688 0.938 2.726
United Kingdom 1.480 1.065 1.065
United States 1.791 1.054 0.679
Source: Demirguc-Kunt, A. and V. Maksimovic. 1996. "Stock Market
Development and Firm Financing Choices", The World Bank Economic 
Review, vol.10. no.2, p.354.
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Country Year No. of firms No.of group 
affiliated firms
(Median size of 
group affiliated 
firms)/(Median size 
of un-affiliated 
firms)
Median of ROA of 
group affliated firms 
(%)
Median of ROA of 
unaffliated firms (%)
Median stadard 
deviation of ROA, 
group affiliated 
firms (%)
Median stadard 
deviation of ROA,  
unaffiliated firms 
(%)
Argentina 90-97 25 11 5.53 3.95 7.78** 3.67 4.91**
Brazil 90-97 108 51 2.50 3.3 1.85** 4.05 5.07
Chile 89-96 225 50 18.71 5.93 2.2* 4.42 4.10
Colobia 88-97 16 7 4.54 1.43 0.90 7.40 9.02
India 90-97 5446 1821 4.37 11.73 9.56* 4.65 4.37*
Indonesia 93-95 236 153 2.79 7.31 7.81 1.93 2.53*
Israel 93-95 183 43 4.99 5.6 3.90 4.40 6.80
Korea 91-95 427 218 3.63 4.85 5.12 1.88 2.58*
Mexico 88-97 55 19 2.29 8.22 6.08 4.89 4.92
Peru 88-97 21 5 1.62 7.92 7.86 10.51 9.98
Philippines 92-97 148 37 3.43 7.32 3.98 2.48 2.95
Taiwan 90-97 178 79 2.05 5.07 6.22 1.75 2.26**
Thailand 92-97 415 258 2.33 2.9 4.41* 4.32 4.93**
Turkey 88-97 40 21 0.96 24.62 26.32 12.52 12.37
Venezuela 88-97 11 2 1.45 3.68 4.60 6.11 3.9*
Pre-war Japan 32-43 58 17 6.80 5.5 6.40 4.40 7.10
Post-war Japan 77-92 1002 94 8.50 3.41 3.63 2.23 2.29
Firm numbers, as well as statistics on firm size (total assets) and median return on ssets (ROA) are all based on the year for which we have maximal coverage 
for the country in question.  Firms with profit rates above 100 percent or below -100 percent are excluded from the analysis.  In pre-was Japan
group affliation refers to affliation in the largest three zaibatzu only.  In post-war Japan, group members are defined as members of Presidents' Club only.  
Significance levels for the comparisons of medians are based on Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. * denotes significance at 5 percent level and **denotes 
Table 11: Group affilication around the world
Note: The table shows summary statistics on group risk and operating performance for fifteen emerging markets as well as for pre-and post-was Japan.  
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Table 12.  Debt-equity ratios of Korean Chaebols (million won)
Company Total Assets Debt Debt/equity ratio 
Samsung 50856.4 37043.6 268.2
Hyundai 53183.7 43319.3 439.1
Daewoo 34205.6 26383.2 337.3
Lucky-Goldstar 37068.4 28765.6 346.5
Hanjin 13904.5 11787.7 556.9
Kia 14161.9 11890.9 523.6
Ssanyong 15807.2 12701.4 409.0
Sunkyong 22726.6 18040.3 385.0
Hanwha 10967.7 9718.8 778.2
Daelim 5793.3 4586.5 380.1
Kumho 7398.0 6117.9 477.9
Doosan 6402.0 5594.0 692.3
Halla 6626.5 6320.8 2067.6
Sammi 2515.4 2593.3 3329.0
Hyosung 4124.4 3252.8 373.2
Hanil 2628.1 2231.8 563.2
Dong-Ah Construction 6287.9 4905.8 355.0
Kohap 3653.6 3123.6 589.4
Jinro 3940.5 3865.2 8598.7
Dongkuk Steel 3697.5 2536.4 218.4
Source: Finance Times, August 8, 1997 reproduced in Singh 1998.
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Region/economy
1998 1999 1998 1999
Developed countries: 445.1 644.6 511.4 677.3
European Union 187.9 344.5 284.4 497.7
United States 209.5 233.0 137.4 112.4
Japan 4.0 15.9 1.3 9.8
Developing countries 80.7 63.4 19.2 41.2
Africa 0.7 0.6 0.2 0.4
Latin American and the Caribbean 63.9 37.2 12.6 24.9
Europe 0.3
Asia 16.1 25.3 6.4 15.9
Pacific 0.1
Central and Easter Europe
b
5.1 10.3 1.0 1.6
World
c
531.6 720.1 531.6 720.1
Source: UUNCTAD, FDI/TNC database
Notes:
a: Cross-border M&As that result in the acquisition of more than 10 per cent equity share
b: Includes the countries of the former Yugoslavia
c: Includes amounts which cannot be allocatied by region
Sector/Industry 1990 1995 1998 1999
Primary 15 76 146 47
Secondary 54 457 5087 8125
Tertiary 102 1935 5633 6547
Total 171 2468 10866 14719
Source: UN World Investment Report 2000
most affected by the financial crisisa, by sector, 1990-1999
Table13b.  Sales of cross-border M&As in the five Asian countries 
Table 13a.  Cross-border M&As
a
: Sales and Purchases, 1998-99 (USD b.)
Sales Purchases
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Table 14. Concentration Ratios in Emerging Economies 
Economy   Three-firm concentration ratios 
   Share 
Japan, 1980    56 
 
Korea, Rep. of, 1981   62 
Taiwan, China, 1981   49 
Four-firm concentration ratios 
_____________________________________________________________________
________ 
Argentina, 1984   43 
Brazil, 1980   51 
Chile, 1979   50 
India, 1984   46 
Indonesia, 1985   56 
Mexico, 1980   48 
Pakistan, 1985   68 
Turkey, 1976   67 
United States, 1972   40 
Source: World Bank 1993 
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Table 15: Mean values of , YLR and  2. 
Mean  Mean YLR Mean 2 
Brazil 0.013 0.003 0.418 
India 0.229 0.003 0.282 
Jordan 0.348 0.05 0.299 
Korea 0.323 0.005 0.3 
Malaysia 0.349 0.009 0.302 
Mexico 0.222 -0.002 0.316 
Zimbabwe 0.421 0.157 0.249 
Source: Glen, Lee and Singh (2000) 
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Table 16. Persistence of Profitability Studies for Industrial Countries 
 
Author                 Country   Sample     Observations    Number    Sample 
mean 
                     Period       per firm            of firms      (Lamda [i] ) 
 
Geroski and Jacquemin (1988) UK     1947-77         29   51  0.488
     France  1965-82         18  55  0.412
    Germany 1961-81 21  28   0.410 
 
Schwalbach et.al (1989)  Germany 1961-82 22  299   0.485 
 
Mueller (1990)                 US  1950-72         23  551   0.183 
 
Cubbin and Geroski (1990) UK  1948-77         30  243   0.482
  
Khemani and Shapiro (1990)   Canada  1964-82         19  129   0.425 
 
Odagiri and Yamawaki (1990) Japan  1964-82         19  376   0.465 
 
Schohl (1990)   Germany 1961-81 21  283   0.509 
 
Waring (1996)
c 
     US  1970-89 20          12,986   0.540 
Source – Goddard and Wilson (1999) 
a - Based on nominal profit on capital, before tax 
b – Estimations are for industry groups. Estimates of lamda are from a range of 
specifications for the persistence model, which differ across industries.   
c -  Estimate based on pooled data for 128 industry groups.  The mean lamda has been 
estimated by the present authors from the data in Table 3 of Waring (1996). 
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Appendix 1
Following is a summary of the set of Principles of Corporate Governance laid out by
the OECD and quoted from Iskander and Chamlou (2000):
 The rights of shareholders (and others) to receive relevant information about the
company in a timely manner, to have the opportunity to participate in decision
concerning fundamental corporate changes, and to share in the profits of the
corporation, among others.  Markets for corporate control, should be efficient and
transparent, and share-holders should consider the costs and benefits of exercising
their voting rights.
 Equitable treatment of shareholders, especially minority and foreign shareholders,
with full disclosure of material information and prohibition of abusive self-dealing
and insider trading.  All shareholders of the same class should be treated equally.
Members of the board and managers should be required to disclose any material
interest in transactions.
 Recognition of the role of stakeholders in corporate governance, as established by
law.  The corporate governance framework should encourage active co-operation
between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs and financially
sound enterprises.
 Timely and accurate disclosure and transparency on all matters material to
company performance, ownership, and governance and relating to other issues
such as employment and stakeholders.  Financial information should be
independently audited and prepared to high standards of quality.
 The responsibilities of the board for the strategic guidance of the company, the
effective monitoring of management, and accounting ability to the company an
shareholders.
